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The coincidences that occur in the course of one’s research are often its very 
problems; the present study attempts to meet the demands of several of them. 
That the initial aim to study the philosophical critiques of human rights has led 
to the problem of man is self-explanatory only if the naming of a concept is 
taken to be as unproblematic as the classical division between the name and 
the concept.  Instead, the human in its naming of the concept of rights 
immediately presents other chains of significations: the taking out of singular 
figures of man for one in tension with the universal.  
The second coincidence occurs with the above tension and exemplarity 
in Kantian philosophy. The latter’s unease over the status and position of 
examples in the Logic and Critique of Pure Reason necessitates a rethinking 
of the universality predicated of the human as the unconditioned contained in 
the absolute totality of the transcendental Idea. If exemplarity is in fact what 
defines the Idea in general through an a priori antinomy, then the universal, 
which conditions the particular, cannot be neglected any more than the latter is 
given precedence. The aporia in the series of conditioned and unconditioned 
thereby distends the span of the paleonymic chain.  
While the use of the example in Kant already points to the question of 
a concept’s functionality in general, it is not till the latter coincides with the 
question of philosophical interest in Hegel that the stakes in raising the “real 
function” of the human become explicit. Once differentiation and 
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determination in the syllogistic processes of speculative dialectics is shown to 
require a co-habitation of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit], that is, abstract 
equivalence and absolute indifference [Indifferenzpunkt], then the 
Aufhebung’s return of each individual member as a “new member” with a 
“different significance” is nothing short of an interest in the paleonymy.  
Could there be coincidences to the paleonymy of the human other than 
the ones outlined above? Nothing in this dissertation wishes to deny such a 
possibility. For it is less a question of being able to show just how exact the 
old name of the human can be coupled with human rights critique, with the 
example in the Kantian Idea as well as with function and Hegelian interest. 
Like all notions, “coincidence” risks the claim to some sort of mastery or 
sovereignty. That the present study must therefore be avowing the 
convergence of lines from human rights to Kant and Hegel, therefore to 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment reason is a conclusion, which any 
attentive and responsible reading would hasten to avoid. A critical operation 
of any paleonymy writes against the grain and gramme of categorical or 
disciplinary assurances.  
Whereas for Hegel philosophical science “cannot borrow its method 
from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain 
satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments 
based on grounds adduced by external reflection” (SL, “Preface to the First 
Edition” 27), these days we are persuaded otherwise that anything can be 
borrowed as long as it is justified in advance by an applicability to the issue at 
 4 
hand. What both the earlier idealism and later-day insubordinations would 
refrain from thinking is the non-coincidental coinciding in every naming of a 
concept – whether it be the old name of man and if the latter ought to be in 
turn better named by literature or philosophy. That the paleonymy of the 
human is effected through a falling out from such domains is hence co-
extensive with the writing of this preface. If by chance they come to share an 
opening, it would be one, which transforms the ideal interiority of writing 
such that the latter is no more capable of usurping the post-facing of its body 





























CHAPTER ONE:  







After Metamorphosis is completed and sent out to print, Kafka writes to his 
editor Kurt Wolff Verlag on 25 Oct, 1915: 
It struck me that [Ottomar] Starke, as an illustrator might want 
to draw the insect itself. Not that, please not that! I do not want 
to restrict him, but only to make this plea out of my deeper 
knowledge of the story. The insect itself cannot be depicted. It 
cannot even be shown from a distance [...] If I were to offer 
suggestions for an illustration, I would choose such scenes as 
the following: the parents and the head clerk in front of the 
locked door, or even better, the parents and the sister in the 
lighted room with the door open and adjoining room that lies in 
darkness" (Letters to Friends, Family and Editors 114-5).  
 
Kafka’s objection to the possible illustration is not so simple. After all, 
the suggested scenes above tell us that he will be just as disagreeable if the 
illustrator has decided to draw not the insect but a man; not just any man but 
Gregor Samsa recognisable as man. For all we know, Kafka’s reluctance is 
that “the insect itself” will most likely be drawn too completely insect-like, 
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and if a human figure, too singularly Gregor-like. To depict a particular insect 
such that it is specifically Gregor and further yet man in general as such– that 
was first and foremost the challenge of the writer, with his “deeper knowledge 
of the story.” In the end, Kafka succeeds where Gregor’s actual 
metamorphosis fails. For what encourages a reading of Metamorphosis as an 
account of dehumanisation works stealthly at the same time for an 
anthropomorphism. A certain notion of the human is a thin line that cuts both 
ways and we do not know just how much of either is too much to illustrate 
despite there always having some claims to “a deeper knowledge of the story.” 
It is not sufficient to seek an escape from the sense of authority and 
legitimisation present in such an encounter. Authorisations – authorships of 
irrevocably institutional, disciplinary and hence always of political and 
historical natures are in the first place also effects of the relation between a 
notion and its various axis. It should be apparent that by calling the human a 
“notion” we have not only momentarily retained the generality of our subject 
but also the generality of an Introduction. Until a grammatical, logical relation 
generates together the naming of a concept or terminology, we have yet to 
name the human and there is nothing illogical or unbecoming of it being 
turned into a catchphrase, a mutation, metamorphosis, or even, as we can 
imagine, an insect. And so to maintain a grasp on any of these relations, to be 
able to claim a “deeper knowledge” of that from which it is itself re-
constituted, an authority must strive to give the exactitudes of the relational 
term in the name of the notion while not yet naming it and even to the extent 
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of excluding it. A mastery that wants to be immune to its own authoritative 
trappings – whether it takes the form of that of the concept to the example in 
Kant or that of the philosophical interest to its function in Hegel – has its 
origins in the classical division of the concept and the name.  
The tendency to keep apart the concept and the name derives from the 
corresponding, Greek distinction between an “appellation” and “proper name” 
with the word “proper” in Greek translated as “genuine.” Both refer to living 
things or objects. The former is used more generally as in “man” or “a line” 
while the latter refers specifically to a “Socrates” or “diagonal.” According to 
this division, a proper name would always name the exactitude of a concept or 
an appellation. In Meno, a lesson on “proper naming” is played out to its 
fullest implication. For when the Socrates teaches Meno’s slave about the 
“proper name” of the line, which the learned calls the diagonal, he does not 
make the same a-propriation for his interlocutor (85b-c). The slave-boy 
continues to be addressed as Meno’s slave in the same sentence; it is about 
just as genuine as his name can get. As a slave, his only name throughout the 
dialogue would be stealthly predicated on his master’s and is fettered from 
naming the general relation of man.  
In chapter XII of Aristotle’s Categories, relation is a category when a 
thing is said to be what it is from its being of some other thing or not. All 
relatives have their correlates, with the proviso “that they are rightly defined” 
(53). For “even where the right names do exist and the things are admittedly 
correlates, no correlation appears, when we give one of these two a name that 
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in no way brings out the relation and has some irrelevant meaning” (53). Here, 
Aristotle’s example of a casual, inaccurate correlate is the word “man” or 
“biped” in relation to “slave” when the proper correlate should be the word 
“master.” If the slave is defined in relation to man, then neither is there any 
correlation nor relevant meaning (53). The concept of man is thus not as 
general as an appellation makes itself out to be; it demands that it is properly 
correlated to a name, for instance, that of “Meno.” Not unlike Plato, even if 
“slave” alone were a right enough or genuine enough name, it would not have 
for Aristotle any relevant meaning in relation to the concept “man.”  
The hierarchies of a society thus seep through the very logics of its 
language: an “educating” of Meno’s slave on the postulation of – in the name 
of – the proper name takes place at the cost of depriving him equal access to 
the concept, or general appellation “man.” Yet a proper name never does name 
the “punctual simplicity of a concept but rather a system of predicates defining 
a concept, a conceptual structure centered on a given predicate” (Derrida, 
Positions 71). That a paleonym is named from this other ancient lesson is 
something which no name or concept can withdraw itself from: the human 
necessarily receives “two similar marks – a repetition without identity – one 
mark inside and the other outside the deconstructed system” a double mark, 
one inside the oppositional configuration and another outside of it (Derrida, 
“Outwork” 4). The paleonymy of the human does not exist as having fallen 
from the sky but is only effected in the name of the proper master-slave 
correlation and simultaneously in the unhinging of such a propriety. 
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  Without setting to work the paleonym in the very gap or idiomatic 
play such as that set out between the two lessons by the author of the 
Dialogues, everything would occur as if the human has a history pure from 
hierarchical differences, as if the plenitude of a conceptualisation has never 
been its own contamination. Thus it is with an extremely “strategic” necessity 
that Jacques Derrida invents the word paleonym. In Positions, he emphasises 
how “strategy” refers to “the play of the strategem rather than to the 
hierarchical organisation of the means and the ends” (71). The latter closes the 
gap as hastily as it escapes the sense of authorisation and legitimation 
mentioned above. Undoubtedly, a neologism of the old name would come 
across as oxymoronic and unnecessary, if not downright frustrating for some. 
This is why to put the old name to work and furthermore, to name the old 
name as “paleonym” would always involve some risk. However like the 
movement of the production of différance without origin, to write the old 
name without neologism would only confirm the receiving of its non-effectual 
origin by default, by divine rights as it were. Even more dangerous is it to 
withdraw the paleonymy from the idiomatic play. Such a gesture would in turn 
give force to the very form of mastery that by assuming its rights in the name 
of a problematic relation, forecloses the name from further “de-limitation, 
grafting and regulated extensions” (Derrida, Positions 71).  
In the end, the authority that educates is like an author who “pleas out 
of a deeper knowledge of the story”; both are in the sprit of the Greek paideia, 
which comes to inform the Latin word humanitas. From the enclosures of 
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Meno’s house, do we not first see how the laying down of an authority is 
always a predication of its right to the name? Does not the desire to enmesh 
“man” in a chain of predicates eventually open up the way to some other 
predication, perhaps even to the names of slaves, and therefore to other non-
calculable namings?  
The act of “introducing a paleonymy” in order to say something new 
about an old name is hence never above the suspicion of the desire to claim 
some right to it. After admitting to retain the general notion of the human for 
the generality of an introduction, can we declare that from now on “the human 
is named,” that hitherto, “its paleonymy is effected”? The simultaneous 
impossibility and requisite of the preface, along with forewords, introductions 
and prologues retraces the strategic necessity of the paleonymy. The whole of 
“Outwork” names the Aufhebung of the concept, which for Hegel, is the “true 
preface to all prefaces,” truer than writing, counting, the third term and all 
openness to externality (15). Yet to explain all these in the name of a preface – 
in its remains that falls outside of dialectics – Hegel accomplishes the non-
absolute “textual generality” which he never expected the Aufhebung to afford 
(20). This is why we must recapitulate: the “Outwork” names the paleonymy 
of the Aufhebung in a way which may no longer be recognisable under the 
writing of oppositions: form/content, signifier/signified, sensible/intelligible 
(16). Instead, “dissemination interrupts the circulation that transforms into an 
origin what is actually an after-effect of meaning” (21).  
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This titled introduction cannot then declare along the lines of from now 
on “the human is named,” that hitherto  “its paleonymy is effected” on the 
basis of textual generality. It cannot hide under the pretext of a prior, more 
general notion of the human without seeing that “the generalisation of the 
grammatical or the textual hinges on the disappearance, or rather the 
reinscription, of the semantic horizon, even when – especially when – it 
comprehends difference or plurality” (Derrida, “Outwork” 21). This much, 
however, is certain: in keeping momentarily with such a “declaration,” at least 
the gravity of this assertive address and juridical mode would not be excused. 
An introduction of the paleonym also claims a deeper knowledge of the story 
and every chapter would re-introduce something old about the limits of this 
claim.  
By this aporetic logic, the “coincidence” of the concept of man to its 
problematic relation, that is, human rights, is never merely coincidental in the 
sense of being contingent. As we shall see, some of the most fervent critiques 
of rights cannot deny man the right to its universal conceptuality when that 
very conceptualisation is what gives a critique its authority to prioritise other 
names under it. We would even venture to say that the two has always been, 
prior to the 1789 Declaration and its modern variations, indissociable. This 
does not mean to say that the rights to life, freedom and property, etc as laid 
down in the numerous bills are conflated with the sense of authoritative 
modalities, which we are here examining with regards to the name; nothing in 
this present study should lend itself to such naïve assumptions. What we wish 
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to propose instead is the consideration that all writings of the human, be it 
legal, philosophical or fictional, cannot take place without the naming effect of 
a command. That a certain right to the name is being insisted upon each time 
the right of name itself is denied, scorned or even decisively abandoned – this 
is the simultaneous production of the paleonymy, which this present study 
hopes to follow. The latter is, of course, deconstruction’s intervening lesson in 
and of reversal.1 
We do not think that this third lesson is easy. On the contrary, it would 
be much more straightforward and therefore indicative if the question of man 
were to undertake a study on humanism or antihumanism. That the dilemma 
we first encounter vis-à-vis Kafka and his illustrator is one, which humanism 
and antihumanism have always taken to task has been dutifully acknowledged; 
this thesis could do very well if it can so much as contribute to the existing 
scholarship. Hence any reasons for not attempting a study on humanism or 
antihumanism while remaining with the dilemma of man would have less the 
strength of a plea in the name of a “deeper knowledge of the story.” Instead, 
the plea would have to take the form of an admission of two reservations.  
The first, while being wary of the thematic scope of man, leaves 
unhinged the classical division between the name and the concept, which both 
                                                
1 “To remain content with reversal is of course to operate within the immanence of 
the system to be destroyed. But to sit back, in order to go further, in order to be more 
radical or daring, and take an attitude of neutralising indifference with respect to the 
classical oppositions would be to give free rein to the existing forces that effectively 
and historically dominate the field. It would be, for not having seized the means to 
intervene, to confirm the established equilibrium” (Derrida, “Outwork” 6, emphasis 
in original.)   
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humanism and antihumanism have never failed to set in motion in 
metaphysical presence. On the other hand, a reservation, which sets this 
tension between the name and the concept to work thereby naming the 
paleonym, does not absolve humanism and antihumanism from being just as, 
if not more, problematic than the question of man that they have been in one 
way or the other attempting to respond. For the fact that neither humanism nor 
antihumanism has succeeded in stablising its volatile configuration is 
symptomatic, and not causal, of the structures in which any name or concept 
has been repeatedly constituted as a problem.  
A non-absolving, which does not have to do with a lack of expertise, 
time and space, is then no longer merely troubled with the contradictory 
tendencies that cloak every opposing “isms.” Hence while contemporary 
critics have pointed out that most antihumanisms, as Kate Soper, for one, puts 
it, ‘secrete a humanist rhetoric” (82), it is more difficult to ascertain the 
precise points of secretions where a mutual overflowing of man “as such” 
holds at stake a generality that is more systematic than stylistic, more 
structural than contingent. Yet for the precise reasons that this general 
structure is always more excessive than it can be deterministic, nothing 
prevents us from pooling from the stakes of this generality, that is, from its 
authority, which can only mean that we have to be more strategic than the 
strategy of rhetoric, which Soper seems to be evoking. It is with this second 
reservation that this thesis can neither follow the indicative aspirations of the 
humanist and antihumanist approaches, nor deny their hold on “man.” 
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Chances are the latter shines even in the darkened room that Kafka suggests to 





Kafka’s Gregor is ultimately the name of the man and not the insect. The last 
image of the dead and dried-up body still carrying the rotting apple inflamed 
in his back could not have appeared more vermin-like. Yet it was with this 
same insect, decisive in the last tender thoughts of his family that Kafka trips 
at the properly dying limit between the biological end and existential death 
properly speaking. That is, between the non-human and the being-toward-
death that Dasein is destined, the former which according to Heidegger, dies, 
perishes but cannot demise (Being and Time §49).  Hence, doubtful of the 
illustrator’s ability to capture this demise of Gregor the man, that is, the 
dehumanised-anthropos of Metamorphosis – the absence of both the insect 
and the man from a dark room, instead, would better satisfy our writer.  
By skipping over a whole history of the “human” that does not 
univocally name ‘Dasein’ as such, we have been overhasty with the 
Heideggerian gesture. What are the odds that even the most rigorous propriety 
of man would have another go at “going further?” It is here where Jacques 
Derrida in “The Ends of Man” takes his chances. After cautioning against the 
anthropologist readings of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger in immediate post-
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WWI France, Derrida marks the ways in which Heidegger, in “Letter on 
Humanism” and beyond, is still guided by a “proximity” to the “proper of 
man” reliant on the very ontic metaphors that it seeks to deconstruct (‘Ends” 
131).  
It remains that the thinking of Being, the thinking of the truth 
of Being, in the name of which Heidegger de-limits humanism 
and metaphysics, remains as thinking of man. Man and the 
name of man are not displaced in the question of Being such as 
it is put to metaphysics (Derrida, “Ends” 128, emphasis added).  
 
Heidegger is only able to reduce the ontological distance – first given 
as ontic proximity – from Dasein to what Dasein is as ek-sistence by the 
thinking of the truth of Being, that is, in the name of the thinking of the truth 
of Being. Yet it is still only via the name of man that Heidegger is able to set 
up a certain proximity to Being as against metaphysical humanism. Does 
Derrida’s chance or the “strategic bet” as he terms it towards the end of that 
same essay (134) boils down to merely displacing man and the name of man? 
To answer this question in the affirmative would indeed be a simpler bet to 
make. On the other hand, a strategic bet that sets to work – neither in the name 
of Dasein as an anthropologistic reading that ignores Heidegger’s warnings 
would take do nor in the name of man as Heidegger’s philosophy nonetheless 
manages to deliver – must first follow “the paleonymic guiding thread which 
ties the analytic of Dasein to the totality of metaphysics’ traditional discourse” 
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(127). This thread will lead us to anything but a short-cut that operates on 
another concept of time in opposition to that of a “vulgar” one.  
Metamorphosis, as we inherit the word from Ovid and the gospels, 
refers to transformation or change effected by a supernatural cause that does 
not merely occur radically but also suddenly. Metamorphosis is not evolution; 
it possesses an abdominal speed such that, one does not, as the common 
expression goes, “see it coming.” For Gregor’s family, it is as if Gregor’s 
“human” existence has already been becoming vermin-like all the while when 
he is man-like in appearance. And what is better than a dark room in 
illustrating this sensible imperceptibility, which, after turning over the cover 
page the writer hopes that we will begin to “see”? Ultimately, if there were to 
be any metamorphosis at all, Kafka has to show that it takes place over a 
notion of time that sets itself apart from the time of Gregor’s waking up that 
particular morning. Gregor’s becoming-inhuman, which inflects all sorts of 
ethical registers since he is also more than human demands a different notion 
of time from that of simply describing his “becoming-cockroach.” Perhaps 
Kafka somewhat shares Heidegger’s mistrust in humanism. Both demand 
instead a certain stringency in the preparations leading up to the ends of man, 
a more than human which is not to be understood additively but more 
originally and more essentially (Heidegger, “Letter” 245). For Heidegger, man 
must first exist in the “nameless” while nearing Being (“Letter” 223). In 
Metamorphosis, the room – furthermore “a regular human bedroom” (9) – 
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must be darkened before the insect eventually dies and Gregor could wake up 
a second time round as man.    
In The Order of Things, residues of the “history of the Other” lead 
Michel Foucault to announce the appearance of man at the same time as his 
disappearance. Man, as an epistemological consciousness does not exist before 
the dissociation and eclipse of the four theoretical domains of Classical 
language – proposition, articulation, designation and derivation – by the 
modern equivalents of finitude, of empirico-transcendental repetition, of the 
unthought, and of origin at the end of the eighteenth century (366). At the 
same time of his appearance, man would disappear because he is not Other 
enough (366). However Foucault can only hold the mode of Classical 
language, that is, the power of representation “in the act of naming” (337) 
accountable for the designation of man to a non-sovereign and merely 
functional space in the classification tables, it is the fundamental distinction 
that he makes between The Order of Things, which studies a “history of the 
Same” – of that which for a given culture is to be collected into identity, and 
Madness and Civilisation as a “history of the Other – of that which what is at 
once interior and foreign is excluded in order to reduce its otherness” (xxxvi), 
is conflated at “the archaeological level”. Whether it be in the natural sciences 
that dealt with man as a species or genus, in the opposite but complementary 
orders of human nature and nature, or an encyclopaedia dictionary (339), 
Foucault laments at the same time that the analysis of the unthought vis-à-vis 
our modern cogito will be the discovery of man’s Others in the Same:  
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Man and the unthought are, at the archaeological level, 
contemporaries […] The unthought (whatever name we give it) 
is not hodged in man like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified 
history; it is, in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not 
only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, but 
beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an 
unavoidable duality (355-6, emphasis added).  
 
Critical to Foucault’s observation above is how man’s Other, this 
“unavoidable duality” cannot be thought otherwise than as the mere inverted 
name of man; “whatever name we give it,” it will always be thought 
complimentary and subsidiary (356). Modern thought, after having dispersed 
language from its power of representation and given man his sovereign place 
in the human sciences, is also what hollows out that very place under the sway 
of anthropology’s empirico-transcendental imbalance. The name that Foucault 
would have silently preferred to give to the unthought – a name with which it 
would be once more possible to think Man beyond his “anthropological sleep” 
– is “madness.” This act of naming can only be muted due to the subsequent 
silence thrice emitted from an archaeology of reason, of the Classical, 
metaphysical coexistence of the being of man and the being of language. Is 
such a silence truly the mutation of the “Classical theory of the sign and the 
word”? (369) Derrida’s question, in his “Cogito And The History of Madness” 
is requisite here: “Have we fully understood the sign itself, in itself?” (38) 
Furthermore, if man cannot be named except in the “true” Other of the 
“Classical theory of the sign and the word,” does madness still have the 
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“historical meaning assigned to it? The so-called antihumanism of Foucault, 
which has been taken as a overwrought indication for French thought in the 
1960s, nevertheless reaches toward a telos: “the end of man, for its part, is the 
return of the beginning of philosophy” (373). As for the Other man who 
wakes up from this end, from the “anthropological sleep” cautioned towards 
the end of the book, we wonder if philosophy has what it takes to recognise 





We have begun by drawing some questions from a fiction – and by beginning 
with Kafka our discussion hardly aspires to account for the whole of his 
oeuvre. Has anthropomorphism not, however, always belonged in the realm of 
fiction? “It may even be that these questions are not philosophical, are not 
philosophy’s questions” (Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics” 98). But in the 
chance that they are, what or who can be made out in Kafka’s dark room of 
the so-called non-fictive modes of discourse? With what right or “deeper 
knowledge of the story” can we depict them? 
To recognise chance is a despair of knowledge, and chance, 
concealed in a philosopher’s despair, bursts out in the frothings 
of the demented. […] One day I’ll try chance out, and moving 
across eggs like a sprite, I’ll let it be understood I’m walking, 
and my wisdom will seem magical. Possibly this excludes other 
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people – assuming that my attaining chance demands knowing 
nothing about them! Man reads the possible outline of chance 
in his “customs,” an outline that is himself, a state of grace, an 
arrow let fly. Animals were a wager, and so is man, we’re an 
arrow released into air. Where it will fall, I cannot say. Where 
I’ll fall, I can’t say. 
 
What is more frightening for humankind than play?  
Humanness cannot stop halfway. But I’m wrong to say 
humanness… A human being is also the opposite of a human 
being – the endless questioning of what his name designates! 
(Bataille, Guilty 76-77, emphasis in original) 
That philosophy froths in the chance of not ever falling on the right 
name of the human and so runs the risk of never having the right to the human 
or its opposite, that the arrow which Bataille’s “endless questioning” releases 
could not have flown if not for the exclusion of “other people” is a wager as 
old as that laid down in The Republic. Concerning the kind of primary 
education that guardians of the ideal community ought to receive, it is not so 
much of the attribution of human qualities to God per se that Socrates 
condemns, but in particular those fictive stories which attribute bad human 
qualities to God:  
Since [God] is good, he cannot be responsible for everything, 
as is commonly said. He is responsible only for a small part of 
human life, and many things cannot be attributed to him – I 
mean, there is far more bad than good in the world. He and he 
alone must be held responsible for the good things, but 
responsibility for bad things must be looked for elsewhere and 
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not attributed to God. (Plato, The Republic 379c, emphasis 
added)  
 
Yet another lesson from the ancients. To where and whom can we turn in 
order to account for the bad part of human life? The question of topos – of the 
turning of the question, that is, the accountability, responsibility of every 
question back to man marks the metaphysical circle whereby it becomes 
impossible to speak philosophically outside its Greek source. There will 
always be, perhaps heavier and older than the disciplinary weight of 
anthropology, which Foucault warns of in The Order of Things: a 
misanthropic relegation of the human from within the history of 
anthropomorphism that is indissociable from metaphysics. Heidegger, by 
devoting himself to an even older origin in the pre-Socratics from where he 
manages to espouse a more subtle and complex notion of presence as the 
coming-into-presence of Being, ultimately fails to truly escape from the Greek 
language of intelligibility and presence. But we would always learn something 
from his trail; we must assume responsibility for the gap between a 
(mis)anthropos and Dasein by which all other names would fail to accomplish 
its plenitude. Before the Nietzschean experience could rediscover “the point at 
which man and God belong to one another, at which the death of the second is 
synonymous with the disappearance of the first” (Foucault 373), perhaps 
Kafka, were he to arrive in Socrates’ ideal community, need not be anointed 
with myrrh and sent off to live somewhere else. This is our hope: that the 
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paleonymy might just be able to intervene and say something – good and bad 






Jean-Francoise Lyotard, in The Inhuman, begins with a simple but double 
suspicion, that, humanism constrains human beings into becoming inhuman, 
and further, to the extent that what is “’proper’ to humankind will be inhabited 
by the inhuman” (2). Instead of simply attributing this transformation in what 
now names the human and inhuman to “the absence of defining property, its 
nothingness, or its transcendence” (4), Lyotard wants to take seriously the 
nature of the positivist hypothesis of development, as argued by scientists, 
technologists and “accredited philosophers” to be effecting the complexity that 
the inhuman has acquired. In some ways not far from what we have been 
attempting here, that is, to show the trajectories of the paleonymy through 
certain definitive authorships – wherever they derive their authorities from; 
humanism or not, metaphysical or not – Lyotard stakes the conditions for such 
pairings at the very heart of his project. “’Development’ is the ideology of the 
present time, it realises the essential of metaphysics, which was a thinking 
pertaining to forces much more than to the subject” (6). Of course this present 
study cannot aspire to the acuity with which he arranges the series of essays, 
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“designated for a non-professional audience, and the rest for confiding” (2) 
but perhaps such a shortcoming on our part cannot be circumvented. For the 
question of communicability that Lyotard sees as making up a cultural 
industry of discourses on the human organised around the “becoming-system” 
(4), is part of the circulation in which produces the paleonymy.     
While Lyotard perceives of how the rights of man is also “appealed to 
in reinforcement of the authority of the system” of political or socioeconomic 
decision-makers (5-6), we wish to study how the same term is appealed to in 
reinforcement of the authority of “philosophy.” By way of a right to 
philosophy, which is, we would argue, always a way of reversal, the name of 
man is provoked and abhorred in its very name.  As to whether such 
authorities only make use of the name in an “episodic case,” as is suggested by 
Lyotard with regards to the political or socioeconomic decision-makers, only a 
future that no longer seeks for man as his proper end, that is, the end of his 
proper can tell. Such a future would look out for the sense of the new 
arrivant2, a word that can refer to the neutrality of that which arrives but also 
the singularity of who arrives, he or she who comes, coming to be where s/he 
was not expected (Derrida, Aporias 33). 
If the universal can be said to be one of philosophy’s prominent 
matrix, then the tension between the universal and the singular, the general 
and the particular finds its most precocious, paleonymic effect in the name of 
                                                
2 Derrida’s use of the word “arrivant” in French, which can mean “arrival,” 
“newcomer,” or “arriving.”  
 24 
rights each time a single figure of the human is taken out, exemplified and 
saturated to the point where there is simply no room left for the old name. 
Chapter Two shall begin with the movement of such exemplifications through 
de Gouges, Bentham, Marx, Arendt and Agamben so as to restage their 
aporetic implications in Kant’s Logic and first Critique.  
For a restaging is as indispensable as it is for every chapter of this 
thesis to re-introduce something old about the limits to a “deeper knowledge 
of the story.” For a start, we would these days disagree with Kant when he 
says, “it is not experience from which we learn of human beings’ maxim of 
violence and of their malevolent tendency to attack one another before 
external legislation endowed with power appears” (Metaphysics of Morals 
6:312). That “nowadays,” we need not go far to know that the notion of man 
does not exist, that the human rights crisis alone proves that the old name does 
not work – yet this “nowadays,” as Hegel reminds us in the Preface to his 
Philosophy of Right, “lasts forever” (4). The question of whether we ought to 
remain interested in the human once again exceeds the humanist/antihumanist 
division discussed in this Introduction. While Hegelian logic does not share 
Kant’s discomfort with examples, the fate of diversity, externality and 
indeterminateness produces another kind of fear in the former. Chapter Three 
shall work out the paleonymy of the human with a certain indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit]. The latter, in functioning simply to maintain reason’s 





After this long detour, what remains of the published illustration on 
Metamorphosis’s cover? Starke’s final design shows, in the background, a 
folding door with one wing ajar, and in the left foreground a man in a morning 
coat, hands clasped to his face (“Notes to Letters” 448 fn18). Have Kafka’s 
pleas fallen on deaf ears? Or, have Starke and the editor precisely trusted the 
author’s “deeper knowledge of the story” and decided to go ahead with a 
depiction of “man himself” at the cost of excluding his other names?        
Kierkegaard, at the beginning of his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, 
writes, “concepts, just like individuals, have their history and are no more able 
than they to resist the dominion of time, but in and through it all they 
nevertheless harbour a kind of homesickness for the place of their birth” (9). 
By further distilling this relation between concepts and individuals, Deleuze 
and Guattari, with their usual vivacity, give life to a third enigma – the 
conceptual persona. At times named and at other times nameless, the 
conceptual persona carries out the movements that enable the creation of the 
writer’s concepts: Socrates is the principal conceptual persona of Platonism, 
Dionysus that of Nietzsche’s (What is Philosophy 63-4). If the philosopher is 
the concept’s friend, his conceptual persona or personae is his destiny “at the 
same time that these personae themselves become something other than what 
they are historically, mythologically, or commonly” (What is Philosophy 64, 
emphasis added). Always unhinged, we shall see that the conceptual persona 
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lends itself to exemplification. While differentiating aesthetic figures in art as 
powers of affects and percepts from conceptual personae in philosophy, 
Deleuze and Guattari want us to remember that the former thinks no less than 
the latter. Furthermore, the two entities often pass into each other and branch 
out as hybrid geniuses, as Kafka’s K and Gregor as well as Mallarmé’s Igitur 
do.  
Indisputably, we risk running headlong into tautology by beginning 
with a conceptual persona that would exemplify the concept of man himself. 
Kant warns us so in the Logic, when he says, “For if I know nothing else of 
man than that he is man, I know nothing else of him at all.” (§37) However 
“man is man” can make sense when the second “man” is no longer taken as a 
mere predicate but as a paleonymy, when human is both the noun for his or her 
rights and the adjective which describes the state of rights. A paleonymic 
thread still ties the first “subject” to the second man, or shall we say, the other 
man to-come.  
If today, a historian of the concept of man need no longer decide 
between a history of proper names and a history of philosophical concepts, it 
is perhaps due to another of Kafka’s conceptual personae. This time coming 
from the country, he experiences “what remains concealed and invisible in 
each law,” henceforth the law itself, the law of the law, the being-law of these 
laws (Derrida, “Before the law” 192). This silence and discontinuity constitute 
the phenomenon of the law (Derrida, “Before the law” 192). The law of the 
law is that we cannot determine who the next arrivant, from whom the law 
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decides to withholds itself, is. As to whatever pleas there remains to be made, 
























CHAPTER TWO:  






I. Universal Naming 
 
As is well observed, prior to the 1789 French Declaration the question of 
rights has never received humanity as its official appellation. Once man in 
general is made the name as such, the universalism predicated of its concept is 
made an evident philosophical accomplice to what the earliest Declaration and 
its latter-day formulations have failed to ensure in practice. Therefore although 
persistent human rights violations have urged a rethinking of traditional 
notions such as citizenship, sovereignty, international law, violence, and 
military operations, with recent social theory and political discourse 
welcoming notable restagings of universalism,3 the usage of the philosophical 
concept itself, which affords something as old as “man” has in comparison 
met with a lethargic response. Perhaps it is not surprising that as rights 
become a politically compelling and judicially expanding issue, the human, 
                                                
3 See especially Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 7(1), 1995.  
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like many other conceptions whose repeated failure to command recognition 
and respect in practice, is cast to, as Terry Eagleton for one insists, “apologists 
for aporia” (145) and embarrassingly consigned to “a kind of linguistic neo-
Kantianism” (122). Consequently, we hear that we have had too many 
problems with this concept and that there is no discourse “today” more 
legitimate than that of human rights to fulfil a break away from its old name.  
As discussed in the Introductory chapter, the classical distinction 
between the name and the concept with its origin in the Greek terms “proper” 
or “genuine name” and “appellation” breaches such a break as fast as it 
appears to facilitate it. Plato’s dialogue, Meno is after all only one such lesson 
on the named-conceptual hierarchy and is carried away in advance by way of 
exemplification.4 The impropriety of a slave’s name, predicated on his 
master’s is able to re-constitute itself onto another conceptual structure sharing 
the predicate of universality because “the proper name has never been, as the 
unique appellation reserved for the presence of a unique being, anything but 
the original myth of a transparent legibility present under the obliteration” 
(Derrida, Of Grammatology 109). What Derrida there in Of Grammatology 
affirms as the “arche-writing” within the “play of difference” shows that no 
name, however proper, is “a unique word or a master-name” (Derrida, 
                                                
4 Cf. Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology, especially the first section in part II of the 
book, “The Battle of Proper Names.” It is evident that the essay under discussion “A 
Writing Lesson,” there given by Levi-Strauss, itself never names the singularity of 
the official lesson. An aged and therefore chronological prioritisation of Plato, the 
“author of Socratic dialogues,” however respectful, does not fall outside the 
“constitutive erasure” of the proper name, which Derrida calls “arche-writing.”    
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“Différance” 27). That “any concept or name can be a yet determined example 
for itself” (Derrida, Specters of Marx 34) must be seen from the tradition of 
conceptuality as governed by “practice,” “real history,” “case studies,” 
“politics” and their oppositions in the sphere of philosophy. Only then would 
we be able to think seriously the exemplifications of man from out of the 
simultaneous production and obliteration of “proper naming.” Without 
proceeding immediately to a neutralisation, the paleonymy intervenes in 
different predicates and is precisely both an effect of the concept itself and its 
transformative possibility.  
The etymology of the word “example” is derived from the Latin 
exemplum through the French exem, which means “to take out.” (OED) A 
concept such as the human can always be exemplified because the concept is 
never self-sufficient in its universal identity.5 “Critique,” by repeatedly “taking 
out” a particular figure of the human whose right to rights must be emphasised 
from the outside – outside of the law and its various juridical status, outside of 
the promised universality to which it is super-added because the concept of 
“man” ultimately lacks what it ought not lack at all, does not know that it is at 
the same time taking something from the human. Indeed it takes something the 
extent of a “human rights crisis” for its critics to argue that an example of the 
                                                
5 Derrida’s understanding of the dual significations within the concept of the 
supplement is pertinent to the inherent logic of exemplification, which this paper will 
argue that some of the most striking critics of rights have gestured to. The supplement 
is a surplus and an accumulation of presence. But it adds only to replace, as “a 
subaltern instance” whose “place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an 
emptiness” (Of Grammatology 145). 
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human deserves just equal, if not more attention as its concept, and further, to 
go to that extent of proving that a concept of man does not exist – cannot exist 
because it does not do the work. 
Precisely since we expect this “crisis” to become more than a 
representation of its history, a few examples from Kant, in his transcendental 
dialectic of the Idea would first have to negotiate the proportion between the 
concept and the example, that between a determinant and reflective judgment, 
and finally, that within the faculties of understanding, judgement and reason as 
a whole. This chapter will study how Kant’s philosophy, while preoccupying 
itself with proportion and so leaving little space for the example, is exemplary 
of this paleonymic effect of the concept and its transformative possibility in 
general.   
The human in the conceptual structure of human rights warrants our 
attention, not because it names the punctual simplicity of a concept but 
because it is able to extend and radically transform the reduced predicative 
trait of universality, previously held in reserve and limited within the 
conceptual structure for its abstraction (Derrida, Positions 37). Human rights 
has much to owe to its old name, which has neither to do with historical 
nostalgia nor a lack of philosophical alternatives, but because the paleonym is 
able to transform its universality into an even more powerful intervention. As 
an Idea of what will always exemplify despite and precisely because of its 
conceptual abandonment, the human is universal in all of its singular varieties. 
The paleonymic logic at work here is neither a simple matter of escaping the 
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antimony between the universal and the particular. Nor is it one reinstating 
any authority to an anthropological origin. Let us be clear on this from the 
beginning: the tension often pointed out in human rights discourse between 
what appertains universally to all men and what in fact can only be claimed 
under particular institutions of citizenship and nation-states accomplishes little 
as a lament about the conflicting universality and singularity of a concept per 
se. For according to Kant, universality in the transcendental dialectic is not 
simply a quantity of judgment; it is the totality of conditions which reason 
demands from the unity of concepts and is made possible by the 
unconditioned alone (CPR B379). In so far as universality in this relation can 
explain a pure concept of reason (CPR B379), the former is itself not a 
concept but a problematic Idea pushed to unlimited boundaries. If the 
singularly human is what ought to be always insisted from the universal in its 
indefinite determinations, it is because the unconditioned totality of the 
human, is, to take Kant’s words in the Critique of Practical Reason, a 
“beneficial error into which human reason could have ever fallen” (132). And 
reason, which has given rights philosophy so much of a good and bad name, 
demands exacting, albeit difficult, attention. The human is an unconditioned 
Idea and we are no longer discomfited to take it in the Kantian sense of the 
problem.  
If, in announcing the force of Kant’s philosophy we have chosen to 
concentrate on the Logic and the first Critique rather than simply on his 
political and ethical writings, it is because we tend to neglect that the human, 
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like all other concepts, is open to a passage of maximization to become an 
Idea taken beyond its conceptual limits. Such a passage is never as unswerving 
as it seems. As confronting the specific turns of the limits themselves is the 
example in all of its complicity vis-à-vis the concept and the Idea. As Derrida 
observes, Kantianism is a not just a powerfully organised network of 
conceptual limits but a discourse that presents itself as the essential project of 
de-limitation: the thinking of the limit as the position of the limit, the 
foundation or legitimisation of judgment in view of these limits (“Privileges” 
54). Whether as a critique, a metaphysics, a dialectics, or a discipline of pure 
reason, these positions are structurally and indissociably juridico-politico-
philosophical. Until we heed the implications of the merely human as merely 
exemplary, it seems that we would have little right to interrogate 
philosophically the example in its genealogy, usages, and conditions of 
transformations. However precisely because we are able to regard the 
philosophy of rights as an institutionalised and highly politicised discipline, 
we must take seriously the critiques of human rights philosophy and their 
exemplifications of the human as “a thinking that demands the right to 







II. Exemplifying “Men” 
 
In 1791 Olympe de Gouges attacks the construction of man in the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” for its gendered limitation 
and demands that if this “man” were to be capable of being just, he will first 
not deprive the right of a woman who makes this demand (141). De Gouges’ 
“Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Woman-Citizen” reproduces 
the preamble and the 17 Articles of the original Declaration in order to 
supplement its otherwise partial and lacking universality by taking out from 
the concepts “Man” and “Citizen” “Woman and the Woman-citizen.” The 
result is a list of rights that reads no less coherent or legally informed than 
Marquis de Lafayette’s own drafting. Instead, to the latter’s derision, de 
Gouge’s version exemplifies the “woman and woman-citizen” who are “by 
laws of nature and reason” no different from the concept “man.” De Gouges 
and other notable critics of human rights after her lay bare the fact that the 
exemplified subject of rights is always one who has been excluded from the 
judicial practice of universality, which predicates the concept of the human.  
Better known than de Gouges, and perhaps one of the most renowned 
opponents of the French Declaration would be Bentham’s “Anarchical 
Fallacies,” which relegates the designation of a universal “all-men” to simply 
“nonsense built on stilts” because only inheritors of the tradition of natural 
rights philosophy would make such a declaration in the first place: “Hark! Ye 
citizens of the other side of the water! Can you tell us what rights you have 
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belonging to you?” (48) Asserting British superiority over the French right to 
declare rights – the law of the law – Bentham claims that the 1789 Declaration 
can never be fit as law for all men – for all Frenchmen and for all Englishmen, 
since it is in Britain that “we understand rights: not our own only, but yours 
into the bargain; while you poor souls know nothing about the matter!” (48-
9).6 If, begins Bentham’s criticism, the authors of the declaration were to make 
actual meaning out of the First Article of the declaration, namely “Men (all 
men) are born and remain free, and equal in respect to rights,” they would be 
saying that the apprentice is equal in rights to his master, and similarly that of 
between the ward and guardian, wife and husband, madman and the people 
who confine him, the idiot and his governor, etc, and to Bentham’s utmost 
disbelief, “Frenchmen equal to Englishmen” (51). A similar opposition is 
made to Article IV of the Declaration, that being “Liberty consists in being 
able to do that which is not harmful to another […],” to which Bentham states 
that the word “autrui – another, is so loose, -- making no distinction between 
                                                
6 Interestingly the tone of Bentham’s claim to a knowledge of rights echoes that of 
Guillaume-Jean-Baptiste Target, whom responding to critics who argued that a 
declaration of rights would lead to law breaking and civil unrest at the National 
Assembly promulgating the Declaration, contended that truths about rights needed to 
be made public because they were not sufficiently well known (Maslan 359). What 
Target was really saying was that they were not known well enough to certain 
peoples:  
Have they been known to the peoples of Asia? Have they been 
known to the tyrants who make the earth tremble under the weight of 
their pride and of oppression? Have they been made known to the 
peoples of Europe who surround us and among whom the most free 
maintain still the ruins of the monuments of despotism? Have they 
been known to the people who have been brutalised by the habit of 
slavery and who do not even know that they bear the title of man?   
(qtd in Maslan, 359).  
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the community and individuals,” hence depriving [legislators] beyond a doubt 
of all power of affording protection to any man, woman or child, against his or 
her own weakness, ignorance and imprudence” (61). By taking out and 
substituting these groups of individuals for the universalism predicated of “all-
men,” the author of “Anarchical Fallacies” speaks against the inequality that 
he feels utilitarianism will better rectify. For Bentham’s strongest 
disagreement with the Declaration is its “perpetual abuse of words” associated 
with the morality of its selfish passions (48). As he justifies it, “in a play or a 
novel, an improper word is but a word […] In a body of laws – especially of 
laws given as constitutional and fundamental ones – an improper word may be 
a national calamity.” (49) And no word is to Bentham more improper than 
“Men” – the official appellation of the Declaration – so much so he decidedly 
concludes: “not that the Declaration of Rights should have been worded 
differently, but that nothing under such a name, or with any such design, 
should have been attempted” (62, emphasis added). Although the impropriety 
of the word here is used to refer to “natural rights,” the authority of the proper 
is far from being muted throughout Bentham’s polemic.  
While the critique of natural rights in “Anarchical Fallacies” features 
consistently in Bentham’s writings, Karl Marx’s 1843 review-essay “On the 
Jewish Question” highlights the challenges in positioning his early works. On 
account of commentaries that suggest a decisive rupture between the early 
Marx concerned with humanistic themes and the mature author of the Capital 
and later works, who concentrated on the natural history of social structures, 
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“On the Jewish Question” would certainly fall on this earlier, humanistic side 
– although Jeremy Waldron for one proposes that the rupture itself is probably 
exaggerated (124).7 Louis Althusser, on the other hand, would argue that the 
positing of such a general, singular break is inadequate: “what is at stake in 
this double rupture, first with Hegel, then with Feuerbach, is the very meaning 
of the word philosophy” (For Marx 48).8 Following this analysis, in “On the 
Jewish Question” Marx is borrowing a “systematically interrelated set of 
concepts,” “a real problematic,” that is, Feuerbach’s theory of “human 
nature,” (Althusser, For Marx 46) and applying them to politics sealed in the 
essence of man. The review-essay, drafted near the end of Marx’s work on the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right thus still retains the terms of the 
Hegelian model of society in its content while criticising its mystical form of 
                                                
7 Waldron’s explanation reads, “Though there is apparently less explicit discussion in 
Marx’s later work about human emancipation and the nature of alienation in the 
modern world, and though the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘alienation’ are not used so often, 
it is arguable that the effect of much of the Marxian economics is to give serious and 
sustained substance to those ideas than to pass them by” (124). One cannot help but 
wonder if Waldron, by differentiating between a term and its substance, between a 
conceptual expression and its content, risks in his interpretation a holding in abeyance 
of Marxist “substance” until the later works – a development of itself within itself 
that is precisely that of Hegelian dialectics. Erich Fromm in Marx and the Concept of 
Man too argues for a continuity of a non-abstract concept of a man’s essence (Wesen) 
in Marx’s works from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts to Capital (23).    
Althusser discusses the risk of such “a retrospective abstraction of the result” in great 
detail in the chapter, “On the Young Marx” in For Marx.  
8 Taking as his argument the well-known passage of Marx’s shelling of the kernel and 
the inversion of the dialectic, Althusser’s point is that Marx does not retain the terms 
of the Hegelian model of society and merely invert them (109), nor could the 
Hegelian dialectic cease to be Hegelian and become Marxist by a simple, miraculous 
extraction (91). Similarly, Marx’s rupture with Feuerbach captured in his famous 
“settling of accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience”, “implies the 
adoption of a new problematic which even if it did integrate a certain number of the 
old concepts, did so into a whole which confers to them a radically new significance” 
(47).  
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the Idea, furthering what Marx develops in the Critique as the split between 
civil society as the ground for individual interests and the state as an abstract, 
ideal universality. Althusser’s reading of Marx, which deserves more than a 
summary here, certainly highlights the problematic of thought at the precise 
moment when something like the Declaration of Rights was marked by an 
intervention of a “Young Marx” emerging into the “thought world of his time” 
(For Marx 64). 
For Bruno Bauer, the Jewish question concerns the imperative for Jews 
as well as for Christians to sacrifice their “privilege of faith” in order to 
acquire first political emancipation and then the universal rights of man. 
Marx’s reply to Bauer turns a critique of the basis on which the tripartite 
relationship between religion, political emancipation and rights are formulated 
– the “so-called rights and indeed in their most authentic form, the form they 
have among their discoverers, the North Americans and the French” (233) – 
into a discussion of general, human emancipation which would restore man to 
his social nature as species-being.9 Without a transformation of this basic 
relationship, the “man” of the 1789 Declaration is far from being universal and 
thus far from resembling man as species-being; the Jews as well as the 
Christians to whom they appeal to do not deserve to be called men at all (218). 
Just as Marx criticises Hegel’s failure to resolve the conflict between the 
                                                
9 This operative notion of species-being, along with variations of the technical 
philosophical expression, which Marx follows from Feuerbach to characterise man as 
being conscious not only of his own individual self, but also his specifically human 
society, served as the basis of his attack in the Critique, and would feature in his other 
early writings up to and including The German Ideology (Malley xli). 
 39 
general and the private interest, instead allowing private property to turn the 
state into an illusory community and civil society into an agglomeration of 
egoistic individuals, he will conclude that the French and American 
Declarations of Rights and their so-called political emancipation is but 
furthering the problematic disintegration of man into an egoistic individual, 
homme, on the one hand, and a moral person, citoyen, on the other.  
Drawing also from the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and New 
Hampshire, Marx argues that the declared rights are political rights arising 
from participation in the political community or the state, which by no means 
presupposes the consistent and positive transcendence of religion and thus of 
Judaism. Instead the privilege of faith is explicitly recognised as a universal 
human right (234). As the existence of religion is not incompatible with the 
full development of the state, the political emancipation that Bauer calls for 
must be criticised on the basis of its secular – that is, political – and not 
theological limitations (223). For Marx, the contradiction between the state 
and a particular religion such as Judaism must be resolved as the contradiction 
between the state and the particular secular elements that presuppose it – in 
“human terms” (223). The limitation of political emancipation, which is also 
the topic of Marx’s fundamental criticism of the Declarations, is none other 
than the inhuman disintegration of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and 
citizen, religious man and citizen, an egoistic, independent man on the one 
hand and a citizen, moral person on the other (227; 235; 241).  
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With less of Bentham’s impish articulations and perhaps closer to de 
Gouges emancipatory intent, Marx does not reject “Men” as such but the 
inherent flaw or “optical illusion”10 in the kind of emancipation that the 
French Revolution brought about, which by inverting the relationship between 
political community as the end and the rights of man as means (238), makes 
this so-called universal man nothing but an “illusory phenomenon” (226). 
Until the authentic rights of human can go beyond the vocabularies of 
appearances and the optical illusions from which the egoistic man, the man 
withdrawn into himself, separated from the community as a member of the 
civil society arise, all so-called rights are not “human” enough. Neither is it 
the case for the “Men” that names the French and American Declarations.  
Since “the fulfilment of the idealism of the state was at the same time the 
fulfilment of the materialism of civil society” (239), political emancipation 
dissolves feudal society into the egoistical man as the basis and presupposition 
of the political state, recognised as such in the rights of man.11 Marx’s 
contribution to the problem of rights specific to his time is not that it is 
unnecessary to think the concept of man, but that it is pertinent to think a 
                                                
10 This optical illusion is for Kant, only an example of empirical illusion (CPR B352), 
which is of little cause for concern as compared to transcendental illusion. It will be 
easy for Marx to see that the root of this disproportion is in the first place, optical, 
that is, empirical.   
11 Important as it is to understand Marx’s call for the “restoration of the human world 
and the relationships of men themselves” (241) as part of the larger, systematic 
rejection of Hegel’s institutional conclusions in the Philosophy of Right within which 
it is first formulated, it is equally significant, as we shall see, how Hannah Arendt, 
addressing a different geopolitical context in the 20th century, bemoans the Rights of 
Man’s demand for “the individual to disappear again into a member of a people” 
(291)  
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“higher” concept of man – one without disintegration but always in relation to 
the yet-to-come of political emancipation (232). Therefore in order to 
revolutionise the elements of political and civil life itself the actual individual 
man must first take out so as to “take back” into himself the abstract citizen 
(241). Much more than what de Gouges and Bentham are ready to contend for, 
“On the Jewish Question” – titled as such – attempts to go beyond its being a 
critique concerning the “jews,”12 women or the improper wording of men, or 
even a critique of political emancipation and raises the question into “the 






Finally, and much more recent to our time, Giorgio Agamben in “Beyond 
Human Rights,” argues that given the decline of the Nation-state and the 
general corrosion of traditional political-juridical categories,  
                                                
12 At this point I follow Jean-Francois Lyotard in writing “the jews” this way to 
differentiate from the Jews in upper-case without quotation marks in order to distance 
from any impulse to label this review-essay as “Marx’s anti-Semitism.” Given the 
intricacy which the real Jews have with the development of human rights itself, and 
with which many writing on the subject has seized on in view of saving the memory, 
I very much prefer Lyotard’s caution that with “’the jews’ it is a question of 
something like the unconscious affect of what the Occident does not want any 
knowledge” (“the jews”26) and that in the end it is easy to forget how “’the jews’ are 
the object of a dismissal with which Jews, in particular, are afflicted in reality” (“the 
jews” 3).  
 42 
it is even possible that, if we want to be equal to the absolutely 
new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon decidedly, without 
reserve, the fundamental concepts through which we have so 
far represented the subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen 
and its rights, but also the sovereign people, the worker and so 
forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the 
one and only figure of the refugee (160, emphasis added).  
Not only is it enough “to take out” the figure of the refugee, which 
exemplifies the crisis of the conception of human rights itself, we are also told 
to abandon the fundamental concepts that represent the subjects of the 
political. The refugee is to assume the proper name while its obsolete 
appellation is to be abandoned “without reserve.” Such a resolution has its 
roots in Hannah Arendt’s chapter “The Decline of the Nation-State and the 
End of the Rights of Man” in The Origins of Totalitarianism, which traces the 
disintegration of Europe effected by the two world wars and how it brought 
about the emergence of a new category of the human: the minority stateless 
who has been “driven outside the pale of law” (295). “The conception of 
human rights,” she explains, “based upon the assumed existence of human 
beings as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to 
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost 
all other qualities and specific relations – except that they were still human” 
(290). Arendt’s well-known formulation of the paradox, which Agamben, 
amongst other philosophers concerned with the subject-matter readily picks up 
on, is precisely that of the figure, who should embody human rights more than 
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any other, namely, the refugee, “marked instead the radical crisis of the 
concept.”  
Since rights, as Agamben observes here in “Beyond Human Rights” as 
well as in Homo Sacer, “are attributed to the human being only to the degree 
in which they are the immediately vanishing presupposition […] of the 
citizen” (162; 128), can and should we thereby comfortably conclude that the 
human is the vanishing presupposition attributed to rights, “the presupposition 
that must never come to light as such?” (Homo Sacer 128)   
Agamben himself should be quick to suspect that this is not the case. 
In his earlier work The Coming Community, he notes how the example is 
precisely one concept that escapes the antinomy between the universal and the 
particular (9). In any context where it exerts its force, the example is 
characterised by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, 
simultaneously, it is included among these types. “Neither particular nor 
universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that 
shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for example: 
para-deigma, that which is shown alongside” (10). Like the example, the word 
“whatever,” in Latin -- qualunque -- always matters because it frees 
singularity “from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between 
the ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal” (1).  
Without the “whatever,” it is impossible to conceive of either being or the 
individuation of singularity (17). Yet at the same time, it is difficult to 
conceive of this “whatever,” since its condition of possibility poses precisely 
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an aporia for knowledge. Thus Agamben can only go as far as “taking out” his 
own example of the whatever which he depicts from Dun Scotus’s thought -- 
“humanity” (16) – a signification constructed out of the same root word, 
which is to be, in coming, abandoned without reserve. The aporetic 
community, which “Beyond Human Rights” alludes to as the only place where 
the “political survival of humankind today [is] thinkable” (165), is none other 
than an example of the example, the “one and only figure of the refugee.” 
 
      
IV. Tautology of the Abstract Concept 
 
The refugee has done nothing wrong for being purely and singularly human, 
he or she should not be punished for not having other names such as “citizen,” 
man, or “worker,” etc. When the supposed universality in a Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights fails to be recognised, when something like our 
“present day demise of the nation-state” still fails to protect each and every 
individual on the basis of his or her humanity, the predicate “universal” is 
relegated to a mere abstraction. It would be objectionable to quarrel with all 
the historical and political, therefore factual summation, which Agamben 
provides with regards to the appearance of the refugee problem in Europe 
since the end of WWI (“Beyond” 160-1). What is peculiar, however, is by 
calling to abandon the fundamental concepts from which the “taken-out” 
refugee always matters because it frees singularity “from the false dilemma 
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that obliges knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the individual 
and the intelligibility of the universal” (“Coming” 1), Agamben, in both of 
these texts demonstrates a betrayal rather exemplary of Kant’s unstable 
distinction between a logical and transcendental “use” of the concept. 
Therefore far from disparaging the crisis of human rights, we only demand 
that we find the candor in this unacknowledged duplicity.  
The Logic of 1782 belongs to Kant’s critical period and may thus been 
seen as the matrix of which the methodology of the first Critique and the 
Doctrine of Elements therein is an excerpt; the text is an introduction to logic 
based on the objective unity of consciousness of the manifold in cognition, 
that is on the transcendental apperception but has embedded in it general logic, 
which deals with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason as much as the 
transcendental matrix concerns laws of understanding and of reason insofar as 
they only relate a priori to objects (xvii). Kant writes in the Logic that the 
more abstract concept is, in the first place, one from which a greater number of 
determinations and differentiations have been made, hence it “is that which 
has nothing in common with any concept differing from it. This is the concept 
of something; for what is different from it is nothing, which has nothing in 
common with something” (§6 n2). The human, as a species, which always has 
something in common with the indefinite determinations and differentiations 
of people who arise from it, is a concept of “something.”  
More importantly, to the extent it is only our use of the concept, and 
not the concepts themselves, which can be divided into the general, particular 
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and singular; it is “merely tautology to speak of general or common concepts” 
(Kant, Logic §1n2). Every concept, as a partial concept, is contained in the 
presentation of things and has an “intension” [content]; as a ground of 
cognition, i.e. as a characteristic, it has these things contained under it and so 
has an “extension” (§7). A concept with a large extension is also called a 
“higher” concept, which in relation to it is referred to as a “lower” concept 
(§9). The genus and species correspond to the relation between the higher 
concept in regard to its lower concept, and the lower in respect of its higher: 
“not different by their nature but only in respect of their relation to one 
another in logical subordination” (§10, emphasis added). Since every concept 
can be used generally, in abstracto and particularly, in concreto, Kant’s 
reminder that every concept is in fact an abstract concept (§16) is a significant 
one. The abstract, higher concept of the human is no different from the taken-
out example of the refugee in the logical treatment of conceptions, but only in 
the sense that it is logically subordinated to its “ground of cognition,” or its 
“higher concept,” or its “genus.” Precisely as the disintegration of Europe after 
WWII, decolonization, secessionist movements, and the advent of bioscience 
and genetic technology necessitate the need to account for increasing 
differentiation of people, the Kantian law of continuity shows there is no 
lowest concept or lowest species in the series of species and genera under 
which not yet another would be contained (Logic §11). Yet the same time, 
there must be a highest concept or highest genus, which we cannot “abandon 
without reserve” without making the entire “human” disappear as such.  
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Arendt and Agamben have inevitably highlighted the fact that the 
philosophy of human rights has been based on the logical usage of a concept 
which, being too abstract, contains too many things under it and has too large 
an extension or sphere. Their denouncements only reaffirm the human once 
again for it is what alone contains the condition under which the predicated 
refugee or minority is subsumed. Along with some of the critics of human 
rights before them, the human is stretched out discretely as examples, unable 
to lie still as a blind spot. The taking-out of a “proper name,” if the latter can 
still be so-called, leads us, via Kant’s “proportionate disunity” of the family of 
higher cognitive faculties to the transcendental Idea that alone renders possible 
the paleonym of the human.  
 
 
V. Example as The Proportion of (Dis)unity 
   
The paleonym “man” being increasingly targeted as the problem in human 
rights discourse and the problem of examples in Kantian philosophy, thus 
meet together in terms of what Giles Deleuze discerns as “real events on the 
level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions 
of the problem” (Difference and Repetition 237). Agamben’s call to abandon 
the old name, as a “solution” to the problematic universality of human rights, 
is in every bit as symptomatic as Kantian Logic of the very conditions, which 
retain the concept’s insolvability. How does the example fit in this order of 
 48 
“events”?13 As we have seen, each “taking-out” of a particular figure of the 
human is an exemplification, which Agamben’s essay inevitably repeats. Yet, 
in wanting to “build our political philosophy anew starting with the one and 
only figure of the refugee” and at the same time demanding a decisive 
abandonment of the fundamental concepts (“Beyond” 160), Agamben can 
only reach the aporia of his own logic. “Beyond Human Rights,” in its sleek 
configuration of “real events on the level of the engendered solutions,” has 
serious implications in assuming the nature of a subject matter that is human 
rights, to be one which must decide between the old name and “the political 
survival of humankind today” (Agamben, “Beyond” 165). This section shall 
observe how, despite Kant’s careful guarding over of the concept and its 
privileged role in the proportionate unity of the higher faculties of knowledge, 
                                                
13 One would undoubtedly be suspicious of the appearance of Deleuzian terms at this 
point, not for the least reason that I am unable to acknowledge Deleuze’s book on 
Kant which truly problematises the relation between the faculties, but even more 
justifiably insofar I cannot account for his relationship with Kant on the one hand and 
Spinoza on the other. As a limited response to this suspicion, I would suggest 
working through the Kantian concept, example and Idea in relation to the “common 
notion,” which Deleuze develops from Spinoza. Firstly, common notions are not 
abstract but general ideas (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 54) in the sense 
that they are only concerned with the existing modes, without constituting any part of 
the latter’s singular essence (57). To be both general and yet not fictitious or abstract 
requires a proportion between presentation in abstracto and in concreto – this is 
precisely the aporia of exemplarity, which this chapter hopes to address. Secondly, 
Deleuze points out that beyond the order of logical applications, Spinoza in fact 
posits that we start from the least general common notions and proceed to more 
general ones (56). Every exemplification of the human in human rights critique, I 
would argue, is faithful to this peculiar movement. And Kant – in his very betrayal of 
the hierarchical relation between the concept and the example – would have to pay 
the highest price of infidelity insofar as the transcendental ideas serve only for 
ascending in the series of conditions to the unconditioned, that is, to principles (CPR 
A337). Finally, it would demand another occasion to examine how Deleuze’s notion 
of events fit in with the Derridian problematisation of the impossibility of a reference 
of an event.  
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the example turns out to be functional precisely when it proportionately 
disrupts such a unity.  
The example occupies an unacknowledged position in the Kantian 
system, both in the division of a general logic and transcendental logic: in our 
faculty of cognition into the realm of nature and that of freedom; and 
correspondingly, in the division of pure reason into the theoretical and 
practical. This division marks the overall realm of transcendental critique that 
Kant outlined at the beginning of The Critique of Judgment, with which he 
aimed at bringing his entire undertaking to a close. In other words, with 
judgment forming the middle term between understanding and reason, Kant 
could unite this “family of cognitive faculties” (CJ “Introduction” 15).14 But 
first, we shall see that at the very beginning of Logic, which forms the matrix 
for what Kant refers to as general logic and is “constructed upon a ground plan 
that exactly coincides with the division of the higher faculties” (CPR B169), 
examples are stripped of its kinship with this doubled family. 
According to Kant, we cannot think an object save through categories, 
or pure concepts of understanding; we cannot know an object so thought 
through intuitions corresponding to these concepts (CPR B165). All of our 
knowledge either stems from intuitions or concepts. The first have their source 
                                                
14 In The Truth in Painting, Derrida points out that judgment, the intermediary 
member in the Kantian system, is both a particular part and “a nonparticular, 
nondetachable part, since it forms the articulation between two others” (42). As a 
bridge (Brüke) between the two critiques, Kant’s analogy of the third critique is not 
simply an analogy, for “the concept and effect of analogy are or make the bridge 
itself” (Derrida, The Truth in Painting 36).    
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in sensibility and are dependent on affections, the second in the understanding 
and depend upon functions15. An aesthetic perfection of cognition would 
address intuitions, while logical perfection would address concepts. Aesthetic 
distinctness consists in a mere vividness and intelligibility, that is, in a mere 
clarity through examples in conreto. Aesthetic distinctness is still difficult to 
understand because it goes back to “distant characteristics whose connection 
with intuition is possible only through a long series.” (Logic “Introduction” 
68). Furthermore, each type of distinctness can be gained only at the expense 
of the other. Kant makes the price of this trade-off quite clear when he says 
“aesthetic distinctness – through examples and similes that do not exactly fit 
but are taken only after some analogy – often harms logical distinctness” 
(Logic “Introduction” 68).  
The example is precisely the cause of this harm because it is of “no 
characteristic and does not belong as parts to a concept, but as an intuition to 
the use of a concept. Distinctness through examples – mere intelligibility – is 
therefore of a kind quite different from distinctness through concepts as 
characteristics.” (Logic “Introduction” 68, emphasis added). In the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that 
intuitions, whether pure or empirical as concerns space and time, although a 
                                                
15 “By ‘function’ I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under 
one common representation” (Kant, CPR B93). The specific attention which Kant 
pays to “function” as he here defines it will be further elaborated in the subsequent 
chapter with reference once again to Agamben’s essay in the light of Hegel’s 
disapproval of all functions on their basis of “the inner, abstract, universality of 
representation in general” (Enc., §20).   
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priori modes of knowledge, must necessarily relate to objects, and how 
independently of all experience they make possible a synthetic knowledge of 
objects (A89). In this case whereby representations alone make the object 
possible, the categories of understanding unlike that offered by aesthetic 
distinctness or the field of sensibility, must rise up to the difficult task of 
explaining how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity 
(B122). Thus concepts that arise out of conditions which the understanding 
requires for the synthetic unity of thought, and not merely that of the formal 
conditions of sensibility, demand what Kant calls a “dignity which cannot be 
empirically expressed” – this dignity irrevocably names the awkward 
transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories in spite of 
exemplification and cannot be short-circuited – even if “experience continually 
presents examples of such regularity among appearances […] and at the same 
time verifying the objective validity of such a concept” (B124).   
Upon closer reading, Kant is unable to maintain fiercely the example’s 
inferiority to the concept, and subsequently its harm to logical distinctness. As 
we have seen, the magnitude and extension of concepts that give rise to the 
natural distinction of the higher and lower, of the genus and species – always 
regarded in their relation to one another in logical subordination – renders 
examples not merely as intuitions to the use of a concept, without which a 
conception can never relate immediately to an object (CPR B93), but as the 
relation between its general and particular presentation. If examples are what 
give mere clarity “in concreto,” it is precisely because, as pronounced in the 
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Logic, “every concept can be used both generally and particularly (in 
abstracto and in concreto) […] and neither is to be given preference over the 
other” (Logic §16). To recall, if a concept, “through abstract use […] gets 
nearer to the highest genus; through concrete use, however, nearer to the 
individual” (§16 n1), then the function of “an example of” consists in bringing 
about “that proportion between presentation in abstracto and in concreto, by 
which the maximum of cognition is achieved both as to extension and 
intension” (§16 n.3). One feels that Kant is actually rather exemplary of this 
achievement, which he terms as the “art of popularity” or common language 
(§16 n.3).  
Judgment, as the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the 
representation of a representation of it, strives toward this achievement as 
well, despite and because of Kant’s hasty assertion, that “general logic 
contains, and can contain, no rules for judgment” (CPR A133; B172) as it 
abstracts from all content of knowledge and considers only the logical form in 
the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge. On the other hand, it is 
with transcendental logic, which contains solely the rules of the pure thought 
of an object whose origin cannot be attributed to the object but only to a 
transcendental origin (B81), that Kant brings in the need for transcendental 
judgment to give the rule for the subsuming under these rules – the latter 
being the knowledge that some representations are not of empirical origin, and 
the possibility that they can yet relate a priori to objects of experience (B81). It 
is this yet further rule-giving function of transcendental judgment, which 
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makes its talent “peculiar” (A133; B172). Furthermore, if it is only through 
exhibiting the functions of unity in judgment that we are able to discover the 
functions of the understanding (A69). The latter is a combination of the 
manifold of intuition or of concepts (B130) because unity for Kant is supra-
categorical and supra-functional: it precedes a priori all concepts of 
combination henceforth there is no “category” of unity properly speaking 
(B131) and so exceeds the “act of bringing various representations under one 
common representation” (B93). In fact, the prefix “supra” hardly renders 
justice to the function of unity. Even though Kant himself does not use this 
term, unity can function only as a “supplement”: the representation of the 
synthetical unity of the manifold is what, “by adding itself to the 
representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the 
combination” (B131, emphasis added).16  
In the Critique of Judgement, Kant distinguishes between a 
determinant and reflective judgement; the former is one in which the universal 
is given and the latter is that in which only the particular is given (18). 
However how are we to determine the proportion between these two 
                                                
16 On the question of unity and synthesis in general, which Kant considers as one of 
the breakthroughs of the first Critique, it would be worthwhile to ponder on the 
faculty of reproductive imagination which while Kant, in the first edition, counts as 
one of “the transcendental acts of the mind” (A102) in the second edition thinks of it 
as being incapable of contributing to “the explanation of the possibility of a priori 
knowledge” because it its synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws and thus 
relegated to the domain of psychology (B165). Despite this, the significance of 
imagination is still asserted as “a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; 
and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination” (B152). Later in the Critique, the 
significance of the term “focus imaginarius” for the regulative employment of ideas 
of pure reason is much well-noted (A644; B672).       
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judgements as concerns the unity of the faculty of judgement in general and 
subsequently that of understanding, that is, the combination of the manifold of 
intuition or of concepts (CPR B130)? A notable passage in the first Critique, 
where Kant differentiates between understanding in general as the faculty of 
laws and rules, and the transcendental faculty of judgment as the faculty of 
subsumption under these rules may answer this question. While understanding 
by rules can be “improved by tuition”, judgment is a peculiar talent, which 
does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. (A133; B172)  Kant 
defines a deficiency in judgment as – “stupidity,” which fortunately can be 
salvaged and the solution he proposes is precisely that of “sufficient exercise 
by examples and real practice” (A135na). It will be necessary to cite the 
length of the passage here:  
Such sharpening of the judgment is indeed the one great benefit 
of examples. Correctness and precision of intellectual insight, 
on the other hand, they more usually somewhat impair. For 
only very seldom do they adequately fulfil the requirements of 
the rule (as casus in terminis). Besides, they often weaken that 
effort which is required of the understanding to comprehend 
properly the rules in their universality, in independence of the 
particular circumstances of experience, and so accustom us to 
use rules rather as formulas than as principles. Examples are 
thus the go-cart of the judgment; and those who are lacking in 
the natural talent can never dispense with them (Kant, CPR 
A134; B173).  
It is not difficult to see that what examples so-called impair on our 
understanding of the universal becomes for transcendental judgment an 
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achievement in subsuming the correct particular under the correct universal – 
a proportion that deserves to be “the art of popularity” or common language 
(Logic §16 n.3). However, missing from this section on “Of the 
Transcendental Faculty of Judgment in General” is the Kantian distinction 
between a determinant and reflective judgement and absent from it is the unity 
of the faculty of “mother-wit” (CPR A133; B172). The only clue pointing to 
their unity is merely an exemplary one. Unity thus adds itself to what is 
inherently lacking, which does not by default of this addition become a 
plenitude. For without admitting so, Kant reserves this “indispensable” role of 
the example for reflective judgement, and only the reflective. The “go-cart” is 
to assist an essentially disproportionate faculty; if it is what in the third 
Critique Kant outlines as that by which – the transcendental principle – the 
reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself (19), it can only 
be a questionable law. The power of our sharpened judgment to subsume the 
correct particular under the universal is ultimately a disunity that nevertheless 
seeks to arraign the “proportion between presentation in abstracto and in 
concreto” (Kant, Logic §16 n.3).17 In the end, as Derrida succinctly puts it, go-
                                                
17 We may venture with Lyotard’s explication of the third Critique in his Lessons on 
the Analytic of the Sublime to see how this disunity, with regards to the judgment of 
taste, “cannot fail to please” (16) because judgment, in the singularity of its 
occurrence on the contingent occasion of an object’s form, only “gives the example of 
a universal rule incapable of formulation” (Kant, CJ 81. emphasis added). The 
example of a universal rule, i.e. proportion, exemplifies its inherent disunity. Very 
soon after, Kant aligns this notion of proportion with the mental state, that is, mood 
[Bestimmung] (83). I am also indebted to Peter Fenves’ discussion of the Bestimmung 
in Late Kant, where he highlights the out of tune-ness, Verstimmung in the moral 
power of judgment as hence the latter’s inevitable failure. See especially Chapter 4 
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carts do not replace judgment (Truth in Painting 79). Examples are but 
“prostheses which replace nothing” because the faculty of judgment, wavering 
between unity and disunity as such, implies that we may not even be able to 
discover the functions of understanding at all.    
If the example were to take on the severe task of mediating between 
understanding and judgment, it would be even more outlandish to demand its 
serviceability to reason. The latter concerns itself exclusively with absolute 
totality and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity, which in understanding is 
thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned (Kant, CPR 
B383). Here the unity of reason, unlike that of understanding, is not the unity 
of possible experience (A307). This highest faculty of unity is called the 
faculty of principles, and knowledge from principles is that with which alone 
one can “apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts” (B357). 
Whereas synthetic unity imposes itself on an immediate relation to objects of 
possible experience, reason demands to find the whole series of conditions, 
which is consequently itself unconditioned, whose extension is to be given in 
correspondence to universality in the quantitative use of judgments in 
syllogisms. "The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality 
of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment 
determined a priori in the whole extent of its condition" (B379). In the same 
section, Kant's own example of a mortal, "Caius” is something we can all 
                                                                                                                           
and also Fenves’ introduction to his translation of Kant’s “On a Newly Arisen 
Superior Tone in Philosophy” in Raising the Tone of Philosophy. 
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derive from experience by means of the understanding alone (A322). As for 
the concept “man” itself, we have to pursue with reason since the latter, by 
moving in the universality of knowledge according to concepts (A322), can 
strive toward the completely unconditioned through a unity of appearances 
(B383). It seems rather effortless to name a person and inasmuch as such an 
act of exemplification is solely limited to possible experience, the application 
of the “proper name” is surely immanent. However if the example exceeds the 
function of application and is something to which all experience is 
subordinate, does the concept “man” still contain “Caius” or ought it be 
“abandoned decisively, without reserve”?   
For our concern, the whole series of conditions is the series of the 
woman, the disintegrated man, the refugee and stateless minority, and the 
whoever-to-come, which always turns our attention to the concept “men,” less 
so because it is necessarily “given” but because it “sets a task” and therefore a 
problem (Kant, CPR A508; B536). Can we still confidently claim to have 
experienced “men” in general, in absolute unity? Such a series, as the 
complete quantity of extension under the human, entails universality itself 
(B379).  And only because the whole series of conditions is consequently 
itself unconditioned is the human universal in each and every of its 
unconditioned singularity.  
Therein lies the merit of the Kantian antinomy of pure reason, which is 
never so simply an opposition between universality and singularity but “a 
beneficial error” through which we recognise our inevitable demand for a 
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conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series of given 
conditions. This unconditioned synthetical unity is none other than the 
universality that we have no conception of in the sensuous world. We mean to 
be as emphatic as Kant when saying this: the universality of the human is only 
an Idea, or rather, a problematic conception that exceeds the limits of 
conceptuality. For precisely so, the possibility of such an idea, which in 
relation to the mode containing the unconditioned, is according to Kant, the 
transcendental idea and the real subject of our inquiry. (CPR B444) For all of 
the Critique’s corresponding division into the paralogism, antinomy and the 
Ideal of pure reason, which Kant follows from the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
tradition of metaphysics as psychology, cosmology and theology, universality, 
itself a problematic Idea, is essentially the unconditioned condition of all 
transcendental Ideas.  
 
 
VI. The Example as A Transcendental Idea 
 
In the name of human rights, the exact modality containing the quantity of 
judgment of unconditioned universality is, following Kant’s heading in the 
first Critique, “problematical” (B106). The repeated taking out of the woman, 
other improper men, the “jews,” and the refugee and stateless minority is 
problematical because “it helps us (like the indication of the wrong road 
among all other roads that one can take) to find out the true proposition” 
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(B101). Furthermore, such an indication is also “an expression of free choice” 
(B101). For us, the true proposition is true only to the extent that the 
universality predicated of the human is, as the unconditioned contained in 
absolute totality, an Idea in the rigour of Kant’s own terms.  
  The Idea is at once a paleonym and a problem – it ought to be 
doubted if one condition can exist without the other. Concerning the choice of 
the word, “Idea” to express the transcendental illusion, Kant admits in the 
section “Of Ideas in general,” that “it is advisable to examine the dead and 
learned languages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet 
with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds” (CPR 
B369).  With the aim of exposing the limits of dogmatism and metaphysics, 
the author of the Critiques radicalizes the Platonic Idea and posits it as a 
necessary conception of reason. Very clearly, reason, as the systematic unity 
of cognitions, must not be regarded as given, but only in the light of a 
problem, which arises from the three kinds of syllogisms, or dialectical 
arguments (A644; B672). At the same time, reason is also the faculty for 
providing the solutions. As far as adherences to the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
tradition of the transcendental divisions are concerned, it has been overlooked 
how Kant’s exposition of the transcendental Idea early in this first section of 
the first Book of the Transcendental Dialectic carries within itself an antinomy 
of pure reason and how the manifestation in its dialectic prepares us just as 
well, toward the problem of the unconditioned when used without regard to 
the limits of sensibility.   
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As an introduction to “The Ideas In General,” Kant asserts that the Idea 
is what allows a differentiation between a conception like virtue derived from 
experience that “at best can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example” 
(CPR A569; B597), and “a true original which [one] possesses in his own 
mind.” This true original, he writes, is the Idea, “in relation to which all 
possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples” (A569; 
B597). Reason cannot cogitate a systematic unity without cogitating an object 
of the Idea, yet we are warned that this object determinable by the Idea cannot 
be presented in any experience because the latter contains “no concrete 
example of a complete systematic unity” (A681; B709). Yet, does not this 
series of hypothetical syllogisms contain an antinominal unity? On one hand, 
the unconditioned Idea of universality is undeterminable. On the other hand, it 
must be determinable as a more superior example to all possible objects of 
experience which it endows with a maximum of systematic unity. Kant’s 
preparation for Ideas in general is itself exemplary of an antinomy of pure 
reason.   
Subsequently, while “the conditions of the objective validity of 
conceptions are excluded by the Idea – by the very fact of its being an idea” 
(A677; B705), nevertheless “the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an 
archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy” (A569; 
B597). Since Kant elaborates that Ideals provide reason with a standard, which 
enables it to estimate by comparison the degree of incompleteness in the 
objects presented to it (A570; B597), then it is not the completeness of the 
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object of the Ideal, but its incompleteness, or rather, the disproportionate 
unity, that acts as the standard. There is thus a difference when Kant argues 
that it is impracticable and absurd to "realise the ideal in an example in the 
world of experience" (A570; B598, emphasis added), and the inevitable 
conclusion that the Ideal is infinitely determined as the example itself.  
The taking-out of a particular figure of the human, as the object of the 
Ideal’s incomplete determination, is at once a condition conditioned by the 
universal and the determination of its own standard. At the limits of human 
reason, nothing, especially not something as justifiably proclaimed as the 
“human rights crisis” should cringe from recognising that a taken-out figure 
from the Idea of an absolute totality of conditions is first and foremost an 
object determinable by the Idea. We are convinced that such a simultaneity is 
neither “impractical” nor “absurd.” In a remarkable distinction between the 
practicable use of pure reason and its speculative use, Kant sees to the latter 
that the idea can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto 
(B380). However, he writes, “it is the indispensable condition of all practical 
employment of reason that its Idea can always be given in concreto, although 
only partially” (B384, emphasis added). We are well acquainted with this 
problematic proportion by now: the universality of the human, given as an 





VII.       Right of Name 
 
The Ideal is the idea, in individuo -- "as an individual thing, determinable or 
determined by the idea alone" (Kant, CPR A568; B596). Recalling Plato’s 
practical “idea of the divine mind” (A568; B596), Kant defines the perfect 
man as the Ideal, the “individual object present to its pure intuition, the most 
perfect of every kind of possible beings” (A568; B596). As the archetype of 
all phenomenal existence,” (A568; B596) the human is indeed most perfectly 
abstract in the sense that it is one from which a greater number of 
determinations and differentiations have been made (Kant, Logic §6 n2). 
Theoretical logic is the humbling of the political; the Ideal of the perfect man, 
whose freedom reason sets bounds to may serve us to “compare and judge 
ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the 
perfection thereby prescribed” (CPR A569; B597).  In the Critique of 
Judgment, Kant writes regarding the Ideal of beauty: that what is exemplary 
means a "highest model, a mere idea" (§17).18 Genius, just as taste, must 
produce products that are "at the same time models, i.e., be exemplary, and 
though not themselves derived from imitation, they must consequently serve 
                                                
18 In the “Analytic of the Beautiful,” Kant underscores two kinds of beauty: free 
beauty, which presupposes no concept of what the object should be; and beauty that 
is merely dependent or conditioned, which does presuppose such a concept, and with 
it, an answering perfection of the object (CJ 72). Flowers, birds, foliage for 
framework or on wall-papers are instances of the first kind of free beauty while the 
beauty of a man, woman, or child, the beauty of a horse, or of a building 
“presupposes a concept of the end that defines what the thing has to be, and 
consequently a concept of its perfection” (CJ 73).  
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the purpose for others as a standard or rule of estimating" (§46).19 Not 
insignificantly, Kant proposes at this point that such a unique principality will 
be the “sound preparatory education” for what signifies humanity (CJ 226).  
That the problematic notion of human rights would not be alleviated by 
a complete abandonment and break away from its old name is still one of the 
most difficult lessons to learn and it is neither obstinacy nor inflexibility that 
we are asked to be taught. For it is only through the paleonymic intervention 
are both the universal human as well as its various instances – the woman, the 
“jews” the stateless minority and the refugee – problematic as the dialectics of 
reason as well as for the Kantian family of cognitive faculties in general. Yet 
when the concepts most often associated with rigid transcendentalism – 
“proportion,” “unity,” “universality,” “totality” and the “unconditioned” – turn 
out to be surprisingly supple the temptation is always there to bend them 
backwards so as to make them solutions for our problems “today.”  
We do not claim to have found a solution for these people; we have 
however made sure to keep the rights of their name. As for Kant, he is by no 
means the best example. For one, numerous criticisms of the regulative 
principle as the only employment of the Ideas of pure reason have been made, 
which this present study unfortunately cannot fully account for. With the 
limits afforded to us at this stage, however, Kant’s restriction of the use of 
                                                
19 Derrida, in recognising this aporia of the genius which cannot work from examples 
but without which he or she would not be a genius, concludes that the aesthetic 
domain forms “the principle example, the unique specimen which gives meaning and 
orientates the multiplicity […] of the critique of the faculty of judgment” itself (The 
Truth in Painting 42). 
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pure reason to the regulative for the reason that an object of the idea “cannot 
be presented in experience because the latter has no concrete examples of 
systematic unity” (CPR A681; B709, emphasis added) can only disappoint the 
“completeness” and “exhaustiveness”, which he lays down in the preface to 
the first edition of the Critique as requisite for the “determination of all 
questions with which we have to deal” (11). As for the form of enquiry, 
namely, “certainty” and “clearness” (11) further would the aporetic logic 
prevent them clashing head on with each other.  
Having said so, the exemplification of the regulative principle of 
reason through the cosmological Idea of freedom does not discredit the 
Critique on the basis of what appears to be an uncomfortable surrender or an 
insignificant slip. Kant has in fact urged the possibility of thinking an 
example, precisely in its incompletion and lack of systematic unity, as a 
standard for an Idea. In the end “any determination of all pure a priori 
knowledge” has to serve as the “measure, and therefore as the [supreme] 
example, of all apodeictic (philosophical) certainty” (Kant, “Preface to First 
Ed.,” CPR 11, emphasis added).   
In its unconditioned universality, the paleonymy of the human 
intervenes to ensure that “all the examples are good ones, even if they all show 
that they are singularly though unequally good” (Derrida, On the Name 73).20 
                                                
20 One would have to be attentive to all the conjunctions and disjunctions in Derrida’s 
usage of the “good” here as what re-thinks the teleological as well as the 
deontological ‘labels’ of our inherited philosophical traditions. Following so, one 
must also re-think the opposition between the two concepts: ethics and politics. “An 
 65 
It shudders to think that we would one day run out of examples. The idea of 
the human of human rights, on account of it being a philosophical idea, 
placates its fears starting from a concept of man that is indeed no longer 
commensurable with the “rights of man” from where it receives its first 
official appellation. Just as a person deserves no less rights for having any of 
the so-called improper or less genuine names such as “woman,” “non-citizen” 
or “refugee,” etc., something like the human rights crisis – which includes 
both its most ardent supporters as well as its disparaging critics – is no less 
“equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead” (Agamben, “Beyond” 160) by 
setting the paleonymy to work.  The next chapter shall examine our interests 











                                                                                                                           
ethical and political rule: not to sacrifice too many of the examples” (Derrida, “Ethics 
and Politics Today” 300).  
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CHAPTER THREE:  





I. A Fear of Interest   
 
Kant’s exclusion of the example from his transcendental faculties ends up 
challenging the first Critique’s system of careful enumeration – there would 
always be more than four antinomies if there were to be any one 
transcendental Idea at all. As we have seen, once that which is the particular 
can be taken out and equally shown to be an Idea of pure reason, the latter 
cannot be limited to the regulative employment of the approximation of 
universality (Kant, CPR A647; B675) on the grounds that an object of the idea 
“cannot be presented in experience because the latter has no concrete 
examples of systematic unity” (A681; B709). The other remaining criteria for 
the regulative principle is thus that the universality of the rule, which makes 
possible the taking out of the antinomy of an idea of pure reason in the first 
place and so exceeds being a quantity of judgment must nonetheless be 
admitted as “problematic”: “For how are we to know all the possible 
consequences which, as actually following from the adopted principle, prove 
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its universality?” (A647; B675) The proof, which Kant himself provides 
partially in concreto is an example (B385). It is the possible consequence 
because it is the Idea in itself as the original archetype as well as the use of it 
in respect of which the possible objects of experience may serve as examples 
(B372). However precisely since it so upsets Kant’s own oft-repeated 
principle that it is only the use of an Idea and not the Idea in itself that can be 
of either transcendent and immanent opposition (A643; B671), universality 
indeed remain problematic in the functionality of any transcendental idea. All 
conflicts of pure and practical reason21 are in fact solvable because of the use 
of this problematic universality. For this exact reason, Kant’s solutions are 
proofs to the extent that they prove really the problem, namely that it is 
impossible judge synthetically in regard to things that lie beyond all possible 
experience.  
Nonetheless, a vote of confidence from “the peaceable onlooker, from 
the safe seat of the critic” (Kant, CPR A747; B775): “While reason can never 
refuse to submit to criticism [of the grounds of proof], it does not always have 
                                                
21 In the “Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,” the fact that the universality of 
the principle (universalitas) can always be changed into a mere generality 
(generalitas) whereby the practical principle of reason “meets the maxim halfway” 
(IV 424) in an occasion of the transgression of duty does not solve the problem of 
universality as nothing is provided for a plotting beyond this mid-point. 
Consequently, this so-called proof accounts little for the concept of duty as the latter 
is only expressible in the categorical imperative or the Idea of freedom. Kant does 
give a clearer explanation in The Critique of Practical Reason although there, the 
force of the moral law must come about with an entire turning round of the entire 
exposition of the antinomy of pure reason: “But the order in the subdivision of the 
Analytic will be the reverse of that in the critique of pure speculative reason. […] The 
reason of this lies again in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to 
consider reason, not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality (26-7).      
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cause to fear it” (A739; B767). Ultimately, if the faith in not knowing the 
thing in itself enables Kant to announce “with a tranquil indifference,” that 
“there is thus no real antithetic of pure reason (A743; B771), consequently no 
example would be “real” enough to intimidate Kantian reason into having to 
actually prove its universality. On the other hand, precisely because reason can 
only advance on the “stage of appearance,” a certain opponent of Kant, who 
believes that beyond which there exists still “a higher land,” “an inaccessible 
beyond” for the Kantian philosophy (Hegel, Enc., §60A2) would not be able 
to maintain such a tranquil indifference.”22 As to just how interested this 
philosophical system is in its own exemplification, such would be the question 
that we must not be afraid, at our own risks, to ask with Hegel, to continue 
asking him so as “to make oneself understood within this system” (Derrida, 
“The Pit And The Pyramid” 107).    
At the first reckoning, Hegelian dialectics would easily accomplish in 
the negation of every externality or determinateness of abstraction, 
Agamben’s call to “abandon decidedly, without reserve, the fundamental 
concepts of man” (“Beyond” 160). The fear that we may one day run out of 
                                                
22 On another occasion, we shall have to study this mode of address for more would 
have to be said than simply how the confrontation, amongst others, between the 
Kantian and Hegelian Idea is a polemical one. Perhaps then we would be able to think 
polemics as an effect of the philosophical Idea, which belongs no more to philosophy 
but also to history, literature, linguistics, science, psychoanalysis, or to the genre of 
philosophy that is properly political. No doubt, such a study carries more than the 
sum of its subject matter – “That which has become disputable [streitig] here is not 
the subject-matter but rather the tone [nicht die Sache, sondern de Ton]” (A 744; B 
722, Fenves’ translation in his Introduction to Raising the Tone of Philosophy] – and 
would first disrupt the classical distinction of internal dissension (stásis) and outright 
war between foreigners (pólemos).  
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examples of man is hence something that would not appear to affect Hegel 
since the “whole of logic consists of examples” (Hegl, SL 834), which prove 
how the subject matter is “only an image or even a name” (833). In fact, 
should the paleonymy of the human be a subject matter worthy of true 
philosophical method, it could not be anything but an example of the 
application of the method to a more concrete object.23 Fear is, after all, as 
Hegel explains in the Aesthetics merely exemplary of the “indefinite dull 
region of the spirit” (208).  
In the case of fear, for example, something is present in 
which the subject has an interest, but at the same time he 
sees the approach of the negative which threatens to 
destroy what he is interested in, and now he finds 
unmediated in himself the interest and the negative, both as 
contradictory affections of his subjectivity (208, emphasis 
added).         
Since something so exemplary to the extent that it can be a subject 
matter for true philosophical method must grasp the positive determinations in 
the negative as “the sole thing that matters” (SL 833), everything hinges on the 
sharp double-edge of interest. The latter must neither fail to be threatened in 
the face of a negative nor must it be completely destroyed. Hegel cannot be 
                                                
23 “However, the exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical 
science falls within the treatment of logic itself […]. In the Phenomenology of Spirit I 
have expounded an example of this method in application to a more concrete object, 
namely to consciousness” (SL 53-4). Having quoted this section from Hegel, there 
must be none of the rush to an anthropological reading of consciousness, which we 
have already observed in the Introduction to this thesis. In “Outworks,” Derrida notes 
that the example determined by the whole in fact envelops the whole; application and 
method, subject and object, beginning and result thus develop and presuppose each 
other (13 fn. 16).  
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too interested in the paleonymy of the human without robbing the 
philosophical method of its positive determinations but he is just as unable to 
be totally disinterested in it without giving up on philosophy altogether. A 
name – the “matter in hand” in its individuality – is uttered as content only to 
vanish and can be a “pure spirit” proper when it has been determinately 
negated (PS §416). Likewise examples after having “proven” from the outside 
the determinations of thought in and for themselves of logic must “in [their] 
own essential nature [be] submitted to dialectic” (SL 833). Yet this chapter 
hopes to show how both the name and the example, as the paleonymy of the 
human, are more interesting than the extent to which their servility to dialectic 
is meant to be due to the middle term of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit], which 
functions as the openness to an example or a name in external and abstract 
equivalence.24  
Indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] must undergo a process of self-
mediation to result in a simple unity, that is, absolute Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt] (SL 375). Since “what is aufgehoben25 is not thereby 
                                                
24 Hence it is not simply a matter of rhetoric – but has rhetoric ever been simply a 
concern of itself? – that determines how a Hegelian “interest” will be employed here; 
the latter concerns the entirety of dialectics’ methodological and thus philosophical 
rigour. The unity and self-enveloping of “method” and “attitude” spells the cunning 
of Hegelian reason. The same may be said for “indifference,” as will be examined in 
this chapter.    
25 To avoid problems of translation, the German word “Aufhebung” and its variations 
are left in its German original throughout this section. Aufhebung literally translates 
into a “lifting-up,” but Hegel also means for it in the positive element of a 
preservation, specifically, a entering into unity with its opposite. The contradictory 
meanings of this word itself, however, are always excessive and unsolvable by the 
Aufhebung of difference determined as contradiction according to the syllogism of 
speculative dialectics. As Derrida shows with the word “Différance,” it marks its 
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reduced to nothing” (SL 107, emphasis added) but now have a “different 
significance” (108), Hegelian logic cannot raise the cool head of Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt] alone as its highest. As it turns out, what is truly exemplary 
is the fear that there is an interest in a pure functioning that disrupts the system 
of totality.   
This is how the two seemingly extreme paths presented in “Beyond 
Human Rights” between the “fundamental concepts” of human rights and 
“one and only figure of the refugee” (160) meets again here in the trembling 
of Hegelian interest. While the example, as a transcendental Idea of 
universality in Kant goes to show the aporetic logic inherent in Agamben’s 
contention for the decisive abandonment of “man,” Hegel’s apparent ease with 
both the name and the example is only possible via a subordination of the 
functional indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] of universality to that of absolute 
Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt]. As we shall later see, the powers of such a 
possible subordination cannot be underestimated; Agamben shall revoke the 
“real function” of “man” in his essay “Beyond Human Rights.”  
That Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt], as the turning point of the self-
consummating syllogism is able to bring the three modes – the universal, 
particular and singular26 – together as the posited identity of one and the same 
                                                                                                                           
effects in all texts in general. Cf. Positions and “Différance” in Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, especially page 19-20, fn 23.  
26 A.V. Miller translates Einzelne as “individual.” Geraets et. al follow H. S. Marcran 
in translating Einzelne as “singular,” underscoring the important distinction between 
the “individual” and the “singular” (Enc., xix). When referring to Miller’s translation 
of both the Science of Logic and Phenomenology of Spirit, I take the liberty of 
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universal is all very well and certainly something, which brings reason to a 
“higher land,” inaccessible to Kantian philosophy. But if we do not wish for 
all moments to have “lost validity of their own, and are valid therefore only as 
a universal” (Hegel, PS §410-11), if precisely we beseech together with the 
author of “Beyond Human Rights” that each single determination of man can 
be differentiated, taken out and tirelessly returned into the beginning as that of 
a “new member” (SL 842), indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] cannot vanish as 
part of the dialectical interest. The co-habitation of these two precise forms of 
indifferences ensures that the repeated setting to work of the paleonymy of the 
human is simultaneously what enables it to intervene in its own name.  
 
 
II. The Risks of An Inexhaustible Human Race 
 
Kant terms his first Critique’s solution of the antinomies, as cosmical concepts 
of “the world whole” (CPR, A408). According to Hegel, one of the precise 
problems with Kant is that he is too interested in the world: his solution of the 
antinomies is too “trivial” because “it consists merely in a tenderness for the 
things of this world” (Hegel, Enc., §48). Reason, on the other hand, has an 
“interest” insofar as the identity of both the world of Appearance 
[erscheinung] as well as the world in and of itself is the essential relation of 
                                                                                                                           
changing the word “individual” to “singular” both because I agree more in Geraets 
and Harris’ explanations as well as for consistent clarity in this thesis.    
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opposition, and thus their concrete unity. In the first place, the whole notion of 
end as the unity in-itself of the subjective and the objective posited as being-
for-self (Hegel, Enc., §212A) is only one of the ways to grasp the Idea (§214) 
and is “absolutely Indifferent” [Indifferenz] to Kant’s distinction between 
subjective means and objective end as well as that between a practical interest 
in the action and a pathological interest in the object of an action (Foundations 
4:413fn). The interest of thought must therefore never be a “presupposition” 
of its objects (Hegel, Enc., §1). In the name of this interest, philosophy can 
then let “objects act upon one another according to their own nature, and wear 
each other out, executes only its purpose without itself mingling in the 
process” (Hegel, Enc., §209). After all, spiritual impregnation is in the Science 
of Logic also an “exhaustion”: “the universal constitutes a sphere that must 
exhaust the particular […] species are complete simply because there are no 
more of them.” (606).  
Lest should it seem that Hegelian dialectics resembles the misanthropy 
that Kant describes in the essay, “On The Common Saying: This May be True 
in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,” reason is too cunning and 
mighty to regard “the human race with distaste“ (87). As first put forward in 
the preceding section, however, reason cannot be absolutely Indifferent 
[Indifferenz] as long as indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] exercises its function of 
openness to externalities and abstract equivalences in the dialectical system. 
Even if it were to work just once, its “mediating activity,” alone ensures that 
philosophical interest wants to have more to do with men than it can help. 
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Most importantly, the Aufhebung of this interest sees to it that the human race 
does not “get used up through mutual friction” (Hegel, Enc. §209). Not only 
might the human race be inexhaustible, it is, whether in its universality, 
particularity or singularity, returned into the beginning, at the same time as 
“the beginning of a new member” (SL 842).  
If for Deleuze, Kantian reason does pose false problems in the form of 
illusions because it is in the first place the faculty of posing problems in 
general (Difference 214), there are no problems for Hegelian reason which do 
not in fact constitute the objective reality in and for the Idea; no single 
individual for consciousness, who does not pass through the formative stages 
of universal Spirit “as stages on a way that has been made level with toil” (PS 
§28). There is no Appearance, namely, no untrue being of the objective world, 
which would not realise its truth in the concept of the essential relation, no 
negativity, in other words, which is not the inner negativity of the 
determinations as their self-moving soul. Consequently, because Hegel’s 
proofs in so-called solving these problems are in the “already mentioned 
necessity of its emergence in consciousness” (SL 49) that he himself always 
makes sayable, no untrue mode of knowledge would be allowed to remain as 
an empty nothing “but must be necessarily grasped as the nothing of that from 
which it results” (PS 56).  
When it is said that no object is to be found in experience that 
is perfectly congruous with the Idea, one is opposing the Idea 
as a subjective standard to the actual; but what anything actual 
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is supposed in truth to be, if its Concept is not in it and if its 
objectivity does not correspond to its Concept at all, it is 
impossible to say; for it would be nothing (Hegel, SL 756).  
 
A kind of actuality that sets up the Idea as merely a subjective standard 
and which Hegel here finds “impossible to say” is indeed “nothing” insofar as 
the single term has already enunciated the unity of being and nothing, that is, 
becoming (SL 83); it is a moment which will now develop freely and take 
shape afresh. In fact, Hegel says the truth of a being that has already passed 
over into nothing, and nothing into being so well in the Science of Logic that 
the whole development of the Concept and the Idea proves the risk of his own 
dare: “Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the 
problem of stating in what the difference consists” and to say “what, then, is 
being and what is nothing” (SL 92). In putting forward such a dare, Hegel 
must risk the possibility that it will actually be taken up. To win, the 
Aufhebung must risk losing what exactly makes it so daring in the first place.  
For the problem of stating all differences – not just that between being 
and nothing, but also that between being and essence, essence and the concept, 
in other words, the act of negating, the entire movement of pure thinking – is 
something that Hegel would not hesitate to tackle himself. Hence it is 
unthinkable to leave the becoming-essence of being as abstract equivalence 
[Gleichgültigkeit], as indifference “open to all determinations provided that 
these are external to it” (Hegel, SL 375). Instead, the Aufhebung must name an 
absolute Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] that “through the negation of every 
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determinateness of being, […] is a process of self-mediation resulting in a 
simple unity” (375). To go to Hegel’s remark on the double meanings of the 
expression, “aufgehoben,” the latter is what while making being and nothing 
vanish as these determinations, returns them as “something else” with a 
“different significance” (108, emphasis added). The latter is the irreducible 
effect of the Aufhebung and marks the interruption of difference in the 
dialectical system. This is why indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] functions to put 
the Aufhebung to risk without which the latter would not be what it is. In the 
Phenomenology, the denial of this risk, the rejection of duplicity between 
nothing and reality, between what is supposed to be absolute, expressed “only 
as the beyond of real being and consciousness, yet equally to be absolute only 
in them and so as a beyond to be nothing” would be “itself the first expression 
of hypocrisy” (Hegel, PS §631). 
 
 
III. To Say What It Is  
 
Precisely because it is only a name, logic has the force to show that the 
determinateness of the concept and subsequently its realisation in general 
already begins in the predicate. In the previous chapter, the paleonymy of the 
human exemplifies universality as a problematic Idea in the Kantian sense. 
With our attention now directed towards Hegel, the same disjunctive 
injunction is here affirmed: logical thinking has an interest to return the 
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universality of the paleonymy of the human with a “different significance” 
(Hegel, SL 108).  
 “Hence logic exhibits the self-movement of the absolute Idea only as 
the original word, which is an outwardizing or utterance [Äusserung], but an 
utterance that in being has immediately vanished again as something outer 
[Äusseres]” (SL 825).  In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Logic is described as  
the all-animating spirit of all sciences, and the thought-
determinations contained in the Logic are the pure spirits27; 
they are what is most inward, but at the same time, they are 
always on our lips, and consequently they seem to be 
something thoroughly well known. But what is well known in 
this manner is usually what is most unknown (§24A2).  
 
When Hegel writes that, “The Logical is to be sought in a system of 
thought-determinations in which the antithesis between subjective and 
objective (in its usual meaning) disappears” (Enc., §24, emphasis added), he is 
not above suspicion when he carries out this dialectics between the well-
known and unknown. For when Hegel emphasises the Aufhebung of “usual 
meanings,” this simply shows, contrary to the vanishing power above, that 
some unusual meanings, which only the dialectics could name would not 
disappear and that the Aufhebung would actually work.   
                                                
27 Cf. Phenomenology for more of such circular naming. It is the Concept itself, as 
“simple determinations,” “pure self-movements” “souls” which can designate 
“something higher than soul” (§58).  
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  In the same section of the Encylopaedia Logic, Hegel goes on to 
elaborate the Logical in a rather customary manner: none other than with “an 
example closer at hand” (§24A1). “‘Animal as such’ cannot be pointed out; 
only a definite animal can ever be pointed at. ‘The animal’ does not exist; on 
the contrary, this expression refers to the universal nature of single animals” 
(§24A1). Yet very soon after, we are told that the pure thought of essential 
universality in its logical form is always “recognisable in shapes”, which are 
“only a particular mode of expression of the forms of pure thinking” (§24A2). 
The pure syllogism has the particular as the middle that con-cludes the 
extremes of the universal and the singular; all three terms are particulars that 
con-clude themselves as something universal with the singular. True enough, 
recognisable shapes of nature and spirit are only particular modes therefore 
“impotent presentation[s] of the syllogism” (§24A2). But their particularity is 
not just an impotent mode of expression; it is what enables us to “point [them] 
out.” Hegel does not even say: “for example,” a dog. Nonetheless through a 
reverse operation, exemplification works perfectly to name the unsayable or 
unnameable: “If were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what 
it is” (Enc., §24A1, emphasis added).   
What Hegel cannot say or fear to say thus expresses the very 
hypocrisy, which he cautions against in the Phenomenology of Spirit as we 
have noted towards the end of the previous section (§631). The “animal as 
such” or animality cannot be pointed out; its “real function” however, consists 
in submitting what is supposedly employed to prove “the universal nature of 
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single animals” – the taken-out species of itself to rejection or denial of the 
dissemblance or duplicity between nothing and reality. The openness of the 
example to even the becoming-other of a dog threatens the Logical with 
hypocrisy because it thinks the name as that which does not name the punctual 
simplicity of a concept. The Aufhebung veers close to the unthinkable and so it 
“could not say what it is.”  
Without stopping at this dangerous proximity, Hegel proceeds to 
another example. This time he does say, “for instance” (Enc.,  §24A2). It is the 
magnet with its opposing poles standing in for the impotent presentation of the 
syllogism, which its point of Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] makes potent 
again by bringing the poles together as one. Once again while the poles of the 
magnet are united at this point, it is their distinctness and openness to external 
determinateness at their respective extremes that enables them to attract 
metallic objects and so functions purely to make the magnet recognisable “as 
such.” In the overall system, indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] is an 
indeterminate, external and abstract equivalence, which as the middle term 
that contributes to the mutual externality of the whole syllogism, stops short at 
the second determination, the negative or mediated. If the latter is “the turning 
point of the method where the course of cognition at the same time returns to 
itself” (SL 835-6), Gleichgültigkeit marks a diversion in the trajectory whereby 
external determinations are introduced. The syllogism is only potent enough to 
present its self-consummation when such a diversion is maintained at the same 
time as the Indifferenzpunkt of the turning point brings the three universal, 
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particular and singular together as the posited identity of one and the same 
universal.  
Hence Hegel’s fear in the double-edge sword of interest: the latter 
must be interested in the paleonym only to the point before interest itself is 
destroyed and before all of the paleonymic diversity results in Absolute 
Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] and simple unity. Instead, the Aufhebung must 
be interested just enough for it to be able to point out the “human” and to say: 
for example and the name of an example that if we were to deprive humanity 
of the human we could not say what it is. The Aufhebung, if it were to work, 
must run the risk of echoing much of Kant’s “tenderness for the things of the 
world”. For as long as the paleonym is more than simply “an activating 
element upon which our interest in the world rests” (Hegel, Enc., §212), 
indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] functions to receive the “verdict of a third 
party” (SL 423). And is not every third party also one of the fundamental 




IV. The Hierarchy of Indifferences  
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated in brief the implications of the two 
precise forms of indifferences in the Science of Logic, whose co-habitation 
disrupts the hierarchical ordering of “true” philosophical interest. The 
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Aufhebung ensures their co-habitation such that the latter becomes more than 
the “activating element upon which our interest in the world rests” (Hegel, 
Enc., §212). To examine them further in detail as they operate in the Greater 
and Lesser Logic, we would have to first consider two corresponding senses of 
“Differenz” from which they are derived.28  
Firstly, Differenz is more properly the stage of determination and 
partakes as the second stage in the development of the idea – Hegel even uses 
it interchangeably with “mediation” (Enc., §215A). Indifferenzpunkt or 
absolute Indifference corresponds to the negative sense of this usage of 
Differenz (Geraets et al., xlvi). It is a kind of Indifference, which through the 
negation of every determinateness of being, is “a process of self-mediation 
resulting in simple unity” (SL 375).  
On the other hand, Differenz refers less to a process of determination 
but to what sets up the strange behavior of objects, which although containing 
distinction, “its diverse [parts] still behave indifferently towards each other” 
(Hegel, Enc., §194A2). In the sphere of being in which there is supposed to be 
as yet no determinateness of any kind, “pure quantity is indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit] as “open to all determinations provided that these are 
external to it” (SL 375, emphasis added). Here, externality is a privilege 
ascribed by reason to indifference and is accounted for by this second 
Differenz. The meaning of Gleichgultigkeit figures prominently in every 
                                                
28 For the precise definitions of the translation of the two sense of the word Differenz, 
I am indebted to Geraets, Suchting and Harris’s commentary in their translation of the 
Encyclopaedia Logic (xlvi). 
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“diverse” moment of identity and difference and exists as a doubled middle 
term connecting the two extremes of a syllogism, that is, the immediate and 
reflection-into-self. Doubled because as the action of external reflection, one 
part of itself, immediacy, still belongs to one of the extremes and the other, 
determinateness or negation, still belongs to the other extreme (SL 403). 
Gleichgültigkeit can never compete with consciousness in the form of inner 
self-movement to be the “true” method of the Idea. Similarly, it must concede 
for Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] to assume “true” philosophical interest. 
To sum up, if indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] is characterized by a 
conditioned externality, absolute Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] strives to add 
the vanishing power to that characteristic (SL 375). The two forms of 
indifference cannot exist together unaltered: either indifference does so as a 
substrate without being in its own self the negativity of itself, or absolute 
Indifference becomes concrete, “a mediation-with-self through the negation of 
every determination of being” (375). However it is their cohabitation, which 
brings us closer toward the workings of Aufhebung. Although absolute 
Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] is the final determination of being before it 
becomes essence and the further step which it takes to realize that it is the 
nature of differences to aufheben themselves, the process of self-relating and 
self-negating by no means occurs only as a “transition” from being to essence. 
Conversely, the way in which indifference is open to all external 
determinations is requisite at all intermediate stages of each sphere of the 
Logic and is not merely unique in “diversity.” In other words, although each 
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sphere is absolutely Indifferent [Indifferenzpunkt] to each other, indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit] cannot completely vanish without first functioning to return 
each singular determination into the beginning as a “new member” (Hegel, SL 
842).  
The term “indifference of difference,” which marks out the relation 
between external reflection and diversity is not a tautology and is by no means 
insignificant. Instead, the relation between diversity and external reflection, 
which characterizes diversity before the latter passes over to opposition, 
cannot be more “different” in the sense that it is connected to identity only 
externally. In other words, it is precisely because difference is here indifferent 
[Gleichgültig] that it does not have a direct relation to identity. Hegel writes, 
“only because the distinct [terms] is [original emphasis] what it is on its own 
account and each is indifferent vis-à-vis its relation to the other, so that the 
relation is an external one for it” (Hegel, Enc., §117). Diversity, as the 
indifference of difference is an interruption of difference as unity of itself and 
identity. Therefore it is here where diversity’s two moments, identity and 
difference receive the momentary chance of intervention: their externally 
posited determinations as likeness and unlikeness “is the verdict of a third 
party distinct from the two things” (SL 420).  
Since the two senses of Differenz appear hierarchically in the Science 
of Logic, the encounter between absolute Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] and 
indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] is not only inevitable but necessary. While 
likeness and unlikeness, structured by indifference as observed above are 
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compared with each other via the intervention of a “third party” (SL 420), 
differentiation demands that the like and the unlike are not simply indifferent 
[Gleichgültig] to each other, but opposed. In the transition from diversity to 
opposition, the indifference of difference becomes self-reflexive and begins to 
make distinctions, distinguishing even itself from its own activity. Diversity is 
torn apart by its own differentiation of likeness and unlikeness in its own self 
and because as the positive and the negative, they are already self-subsistent, 
and each side is thus already implicitly contradiction (431). This process goes 
on until the self-subsistent determinations of reflection are aufgehoben and 
essence determines itself as ground.  
At the same time, the vanishing of “the indifference of difference,” or 
non-conceptual difference has to be accomplished so that difference would not 
exist outside of the dialectical system. As the translators of the Encyclopaedia 
Logic explain, the sense of Differenz which implicates absolute Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt] designates a stage where the simple unity of a category is 
ruptured and shows itself to be complicated and mediated – a stage whereby 
the newly posited moments attain independence and is the stage of 
particularity (xlvi). Differenz here returns the Absolute to simple self-relation 
and to universality (Enc., §85). In doing so, it is also what brings forth the 
aufheben of externality through the negative unity of likeness and unlikeness. 
When likeness and unlikeness, being positedness, “returns through 
indifference” back into the negative unity with itself, the passage that enables 
this return, the “indifference of difference” has to itself vanish (SL 421). 
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Diversity is dissolved because the “verdict of a third party” from the outside is 
still too subjective and indeterminate. In the section just before diversity 
passes into opposition, Hegel’s overrules against the “verdict of the third 
party” just as he judges Kant to exhibit a “usual tenderness for things” (SL 
423). However what is even more powerful – what remains fearful in its 
exemplarity – is the repetitive autonomy of interest, which in maintaining the 
diversity in the sameness [gleich] of simultaneity [gleichzetig] disrupts the 
structure of the exterior/interior divide.  
As long as dialectics strives to re-appropriate indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit] into the totality of the system, the former cannot function on 
its own as an openness to all external determinations but must work for 
absolute Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] so that self-mediation can result in 
simple unity. Hegel must admit in the Encyclopaedia Logic that the example 
of the dog cannot exist without its “proper name” of animality. Aufhebung 
must resort to hypocrisy if only to resume the continuing determination of 
difference as contradiction – if only to not say the truth of anything, which can 
be singularly and decisively based on its pure functionality.  
“All objects, therefore, in which an external end is realised, are equally 
only a means of the end” (SL 750). In the teleological relation, the activity of 
the end must first represent the object as a means before the aufheben of such 
an illusory show [schein] whereby “the subjective end requires to use no 
violence against the object, no reinforcement against it other than the 
reinforcing of itself” (SL 751). As to whether the subjective and the objective 
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are taken in their “usual meanings,” at least this much is certain: the hypocrisy 
in not facing up to an Aufhebung that works is a reinforcement of  “violence” 
without end or meaning. 
 
 
V. Exemplifying The Naming Function 
 
Derrida observes in “The Pit and The Pyramid: Introduction to Hegelian 
Semiology,” that “what Hegel could never think is a machine that would 
work” (107). A “pure functioning” that would work without being governed 
by its final utility, meaning and result “would be unthinkable in that it 
inscribes within itself an effect of pure loss” (107). It would be unthinkable as 
a non-thought that no thought could relever, could constitute as its proper 
opposite, as its other” (107). The Aufhebung is work not just in-itself but also 
the for-itself of this teleology of function and explains why problems for 
Hegel always work as effectively as empty threats. Should we dare the 
Aufhebung to name each of the taken-out examples of the human in the 
thought determinations in and for themselves, such a naming may fare badly 
as a subject-matter for Logic but Hegel would not hesitate to utter it as a 
necessary activity.  
All these must be what it means for reason to be at once cunning as it 
is mighty (Hegel, Enc., §209A). To the extent that “no object, presenting itself 
as something external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer 
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resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to” (SL 826, emphasis 
added), it is as if Hegel acts as our counsel when he advises, that “the only 
consistent defence against reason is to have no dealings with it at all (SL 719). 
And how are we to follow such an advice, which constitutes in itself the empty 
threat that we cannot and must not take it up? At least: 
It suffices to make oneself understood within this system. For 
example, to name machine a machine, functioning a 
functioning, work a work, etc. Or even simply to ask why 
[Derrida’s emphasis] one has never been able to think this, to 
seek its causes, reasons, origins, foundations, conditions of 
possibility, etc. Or even to seek other names. For example, an 
other name for the ‘sign,’ which, no more than the pit or the 
pyramid, cannot completely do without the machine (Derrida, 
“The Pit and the Pyramid” 107, emphasis added).  
 
In Derrida’s chain of conjunctions, which is the work of the 
paleonymy: the “for example” or the “to name”? Which one of them cannot 
completely do without the machine, without absolute Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt]? It is as if a choice would simply have to be made between 
the two. 
To exemplify is always already the utterance of a name, without which 
the diverted openness to externality would be skipped over to the turning point 
of absolute Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt], without which a “for example” 
cannot name machine a machine, functioning a functioning, work a work, etc. 
An exemplification that works no longer to oil the huge machinery that is 
 88 
Heglianism would have to exemplify, “close to hand,” a name of the 
unthinkable.  
To make naming and exemplifying cohabit would not be to escape 
their engaging in a life-and-death struggle of the lord-and-bondsman dialectics 
where the former achieves its recognition through the latter working on it. For 
Hegel, work and service is absolute fear and it is precisely in the destruction of 
this “alien, negative moment” wherein the bondsman seemed to have only an 
alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own (PS §196). However 
fear is not only an experience belonging solely to the bondsman; the “lord” 
himself has to tremble. Exemplification strikes fear into the very heart of the 
name not because without it, the latter would risk being unrecognised but that 
precisely with every “for example,” the name never names the punctual 
simplicity of a concept but the openness to externality.  Not simply an 
openness that issues from the syllogistic boundaries of the interior but one 
through which the “exterior” makes its relevance felt all over the system. Such 
is a fear more frightening than the trial by death or abstract death that “does 
away with the truth which was supposed to issue from it, and so too, with the 
certainty of self generally” (§188).  
That the paleonym has never been able to name the punctual simplicity 
of a concept is not an empty threat, which can be placated by the knowledge 
that “life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness” (Hegel, PS §189). It 
cannot be said that one is simply afraid of the other – the name of the example, 
the lord to the bondsman – mutual fear is merely another immediacy to be 
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reciprocally mediated. When even the fear that we would one day run out of 
examples is a moment of truth in the Aufhebung as necessary as the illusory 
show [schein] of the yet-accomplished absolute good in the world, what more 
must a name or an example, so “arbitrarily assumed, given or also altered” 
(Hegel, SL 117) do to interest it?  
It is time to stop looking at all the declarations of rights from 
1789 to the present day as proclamations of eternal 
metajuridical values aimed at binding the legislator to the 
respect of such values; it is time, rather, to understand them 
according to their real function in the modern state (Agamben, 
“Beyond” 162, emphasis added).  
 
“Beyond Human Rights” with its aporetic logic of simultaneously 
raising the sole figure of the refugee while leaving behind the fundamental 
concepts of man (160) still has an interest in maintaining what was 
surreptitiously being called to abandon as the problematic universality of the 
old name. At first, such a call to finally pay attention to the “real” functions of 
the “eternal metajuridical values” appears to be as unassailable as that of the 
decisive abandonment of the fundamental concepts. Both are “forms and 
limits of a coming political community” (160) developed in Agamben’s earlier 
work and aimed to solve the paradoxical criteria of sovereignty. However in 
reformulating this idea as a “solution” to the paradoxical criteria of 
universality, the former inevitably exposes itself to the interests that human 
rights critique might still have for the fundamental concepts. The threat to 
abandon the fundamental concepts shows itself to be an empty one if over and 
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above the taken-out example of the refugee, the old name itself, that is, the 
fundamental concepts of the human are somewhat useful still.  
 Having said so, “Beyond Human Rights” is only interested in the 
fundamental concepts to a certain extent. If there were at least one last reason 
to maintain “the fundamental concepts of (man, the citizen, the sovereign 
people, the worker, etc)” (160, emphasis added) altogether, it would be 
according to the above quotation for their “real function in the modern state” 
(162). Indeed never has it been denied that the problem of human rights 
“today,” even more so if one is disillusioned by recent rhetoric overcrowding 
the term is of “real” concern by which one would at the very least accord it to 
be existence as an actual object of experience. However the essay begs the 
question of the “real” by undercutting the work of the “fundamental concepts” 
to be deserving of the “proper name” of a “real function.” After rousing up to 
a complete abandonment of the human, the latter is now said to be worthwhile 
of retaining because as “the originary figure of natural naked life in the 
political-juridical order of the Nation-State” (162). Its taken-out example, that 
is, the refugee can then serve to break “the identity between the human and the 
citizen and that between nativity and nationality [and bring] the originary 
fiction of sovereignty to crisis” (162-3). Agamben’s attempt to respond to the 
problem of universality only ends up “proving” what is further at stake in his 
set-up between the fundamental concepts representing the political subjects of 
human rights and the refugee.  
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The old name of the human can revive our interest only when a 
singular figure is swung back in to unhinge the universality that is as 
problematic as the eternality and metajuridicality predicated of the 
declarations. On the other hand, the work of universality which enables the 
taking out of any figure at all is side-stepped; only when universality is 
stripped of use – any use which does not appear and present itself to the crisis 
of sovereignty directly – can the paleonym be deemed as worthy of having 
“real” function. The path confronting human rights critique is not that we 
choose between the “eternal metajuridicial values” with all of its implications 
of what is merely theoretical, and “reality.” It points instead to an oblique, 
textual operation within the functions of the fundamental concepts themselves. 
The interests that Agamben has for “real functions” stand weakly as a solution 
if the opposition to what are seemingly “unreal” still turns out to be a problem 
between the fundamental concepts and the example, never more so re-staged 
between Kant and Hegel. Althusser, when describing Marx’s “play” of 
Hegelian formulae reminds us that any game on this stage is not to be treated 
with:  
raffishness or sarcasm, but [as with] the action of a real drama, 
in which old concepts desperately play the part of something 
absent which is nameless, in order to call onto the stage in 
person – whereas they only ‘produce’ its presence in their 
failures, in the dislocation between the character and their roles 




VI. An Example In Heaven or On Earth 
 
Since the inferiority relegated to the example in Kant’s Logic relies on 
Understanding, which Hegel deems desultory that for the truth of the Concept, 
so any concept that can take the form of antinomial assertions is itself an 
immanent grasping of its own example. An immanent exemplification, which 
does not have a limit to separates reality from itself and is so of no service to 
any such externality. Thus despite all the contributions of the Kantian 
antinomies in nullifying the categories of finitude, the Critique leaves sight of 
the true dialectical nature of reason, which ought to demonstrate that the form 
of antinominal assertions could be given to any Concept [Begriff] as long as it 
is a unity of opposed moments (Hegel, SL 190-1). It is therefore denied that 
there should be a limit to the number of Concepts just as there should be one 
to the number of antinomies; by doing so, Kant fails to take up the antinomy 
in the development of the Concept [Begriff] itself, pure and simple without 
needing to entangle them in the general idea of the world (191). Not 
insignificantly, Hegel when highlighting this oversight, demonstrates in the 
specific terminology of becoming his revolution of the Kantian category, 
specifically, Magnitude, or Quantity:  
Quantity is the determinateness which has become indifferent 
[Gleichgultigkeit] to being, a limit which is just as much no limit, 
being-for-self which is absolutely identical with being-for-other – a 
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repulsion of the many ones which is directly the non-repulsion, the 
continuity of them (SL 185, emphasis added). 
 
Actual enumeration in fact makes no difference to determinateness 
since any two opposed determinations are true only when they are aufgehoben 
in the unity of their Concept (Hegel, SL 192). All notions of unity in Kant – 
either the one which exists as the underlying function of subjective 
understanding or the prescription, which pure reason holds sway over 
understanding – have no place in Hegelian dialectics as they can only belong 
to “limited cognition determined as form and instrument relatively to its 
content” (SL 841, original emphasis). Unity cannot be counted as the 
combination of the first negative and its second in the logic. Precisely because 
any notion of combination is still a quiescent third, logic must grasp itself in 
its self-mediating movement and activity (SL 837).   
Hence Kant’s discussion of the genius in the Critique of Judgment that 
defines the example in a unity of opposed moments would fall short of this 
immanent grasping of the Concept. To recap, the genius must produce 
products that are at the same time exemplary, “though not themselves derived 
from imitation, must consequently serve the purpose for others as a standard 
or rule of estimating" (Kant, CJ §46). According to Hegel, this syllogistic 
conclusion would still stop short at subjective understanding in which the 
determinations are merely taken as abstract, formal terms (SL 683). It is still 
not objective enough because the formalism of the conclusion has not yet 
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aufgehoben sich. The exemplary product is the particularity standing between 
genius as the universal term, the “talent (natural endowment) which gives the 
rule to art” (Kant, CJ §46) and non-imitation as the individual one. In this 
formal syllogism, the middle term, that is, the particularity of exemplarity is 
still qualitatively distinct from the two extremes and simply posited as totality 
by all determinateness (Hegel, SL 703). However the example is more than 
that: it is to be as equally good as the genius or the originality of its products. 
Such equanimity may be properly regarded as excessive because the mere 
absence of contradiction is inadequate for the posited objectivity of the 
concept, to the extent that our proof of the example once again almost makes 
no difference in Hegel’s logical process – “for rational cognition it is only a 
name” (SL 706). 
Similarly in the Phenomenology of Spirit, talent is like the middle 
term, “the determinate, original individuality considered as an inner means, or 
as a transition from End to an achieved reality” (§401). If talent, representing 
the means in the side of action is not united with the interest, which an 
individual finds in something and which represents the side of content of the 
“matter in hand,” then means will not be actual and transitions will not be real 
(§401). Both talent and interest, functioning as means, must be a unity of inner 
and outer, of action and being so that they “[do] not go outside [themselves], 
either as circumstances, or as End, or means, or as a work done” (§401, 
emphasis added). Like the example and the name, they must be reappropriated 
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back into the dialectic and work further in order to earn the proper name of 
their real function.  
This is why Hegel would contest that the work of the paleonym as the 
middle term is replaceable because it ought to be totally Indifferent 
[Indifferenz] to the distance, which sets up the syllogism in the first place. This 
is what it has to mean, when he writes that the definition of a concept includes 
not just the genus but also the specific determinateness (SL 589). Nonetheless, 
precisely because Kant’s exemplary and yet non-imitable genius scores badly 
in Hegel’s hierarchical, syllogistic system, which for this reason is “equally 
not a syllogism at all” (SL 702), the example, as we shall see, has to reckon 
with an even more formidable problem of positioning in Hegel’s logic.  
Despite what seems like the Kantian and Hegelian difference in their 
respective conception of the concept, they share a fundamental view that 
something fundamental must above all be non-exemplary. While Kant is 
concerned that examples may harm logical distinctness, Hegel is more 
indifferent [Gleichgültig] to purity in this sense. In fact, such indifference is 
absolutely necessary at every “middle” stage of the logical division. We are 
ensured that there is no lack of examples for the unity of being and nothing is 
the “primary truth” found in everything “in heaven or on earth” (SL 85). Such 
a fear is merely an illusion that the Hegelian Idea produces for itself so as to 
be aufgehoben Instead, an initial predicament is that all further logical 
determinations: “determinate being, quality, and generally all philosophical 
Concepts” that is, all concepts’ relations to their other are “acceptable 
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examples” of the unity of being and nothing in their becoming as long as 
becoming itself is not an empirical elucidation by examples (SL 85).  
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from the above that Hegel is 
therefore simply concerned with distilling the processes of logical transitions 
from logical determinations. Such a distinction stops short at the external 
relationship of the Concept’s own reflection, which would eventually be 
appropriated in the dialectical schema of negativity.  Have we not already 
been warned that this schema cannot be taken as a result of the entire Science 
of Logic as the Aufhebung gets its stamina from the inexhaustible? Even in the 
sphere of Being, the “continuity of the many ones” cannot rely on a method 
like that of external reflection but only on the “absolute method” that takes the 
determinate element from its own subject matter” (SL 830). Any difference 
between logical transitions and logical determinations that is perceived of 
external reflection would not subsist outside of dialectics. 
For although it is the very indeterminateness which the logical 
beginnings have for their sole content that constitutes their determinateness, 
for the method it is “a matter of indifference whether the determinateness be 
taken as that of form of or content” (839, emphasis added). Hence indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit], namely, the openness “to all determinations provided that 
these are external to it” (SL 375) conditions not just the quantitative continuity 
of the many ones but in fact explains Hegel’s reluctance over giving a subject 
matter and content to logic. As long as the latter is the animating soul of all 
philosophy, indifference cannot warrant as an external, indeterminate function 
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but must make way for Indifference [Indifferenzpunkt] in the pure logical 
form. The example, having being purged of the sense of inferiority in Kant 
and raised to the status of a philosophical concept found everywhere “in 
heaven or on earth,” is the existence [dasein] of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] 
par excellence because as it turns out, what opens up the meaning of place 
cannot have the best of both worlds.  
After taking Dasein in its etymological significance as “being in a 
certain place,” the idea of space is immediately disclaimed as irrelevant (SL 
110). Dasein is determinate being insofar as its “there-being” is merely taken 
to elucidate or indicate in advance the course which will be exhibited in the 
development itself and nothing more; it is fully determinate when its negation 
comes to be posited in a certain place (SL 110). Hegel expresses his preference 
of the two meanings of Dasein, that is, “there-being or being which is there” 
quite explicitly in this opening section of “Determinate Being”:  
Only that which is posited in a Concept belongs in the 
dialectical development of that Concept to its content; whereas 
the determinateness that is not yet posited in the Concept itself 
belongs to our reflection, whether it concerns the nature of the 
Concept itself or is an external comparison (SL 110).  
 
The same preference can be found in the Philosophy of Right, whose 
Concept, which develops itself out of itself is “presupposed” by logic (§31). 
There we find that although any existent in its various stages of self-conscious 
freedom is determinate as “right,” it is only their collision with each other and 
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the subsequent engendering of their determinations in a higher stage that 
counts as fully determinate (§29-30). Thus the example can be raised to a 
philosophical existence because reason is not quite apathetic to the “there” of 
Dasein as such. Our fear is perhaps not as illusory as the Aufhebung assures: if 
reason dictates that an example of the human cannot be found in a “world” as 
long as the latter has another external to it, the human cannot be found at all. 
Yet the converse is more frightening: an aufheben of the example is at once 
exemplary of the Aufhebung in that externality is found everywhere. We can 
no longer wait till so much of the human has been taken from rights just as its 
rights have been taken away from it that we should only, according to Hegel 




VII.  The Untimely Hour 
 
If Hegel’s philosophy resounds with the continuous “taking out” of a figure of 
man, who brings the “real function” of an “eternal” and “metajuridical” 
universality to the problem of rights – the “vanishing presupposition” of the 
human as Agamben would want to argue (“Beyond” 162) – it is not as if the 
first enters into the second as a particular subject, which is being acted upon. 
Both the singular refugee and his rights have their significance only in their 
relation to the universal Concept and this relation exists only in a doubled 
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middle term that holds in itself the two extremes in their complete 
determinateness; it is the relation of the content rather than the contents 
themselves of the two extremes which matters for logic. This is why Hegel 
does indeed go further than Kant’s distinction between the analytic and 
synthetic method: “for through the Concept the subject matter is determined 
dialectically and as an other” and further on, “hence its determinateness as 
content is no longer something merely picked up, but something deduced and 
proved” (SL 838). 
Yet it is precisely through his deduction and proof of the universal, 
particular and singular in the syllogism that Hegel turns out to be guilty of the 
hypocrisy that he disdains. The proposition put forward in Section III of this 
chapter borrowed from the Encyclopaedia Logic: “if we were to deprive 
humanity of the human we could not say what it is,” repeats by way of an 
indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] of paleonymic interest. How could we still say 
what the “real function” of the human is if we were to deprive it of its work, if 
we were to be absolutely Indifferent [Indifferenz] to the distance which sets up 
on the one hand, the fundamental concepts and on the other, its complete 
abandonment?  
After all the example is as good as the name; each “taking out” of the 
human that is an exemplification of the Kantian Idea in its beneficial error 
would be for dialectics the already accomplished truth of human rights in its 
reality as it ought to be. To adopt Hegel’s well-known lines in the preface to 
the Philosophy of Right so as to better reveal what is at stake (13), the example 
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that is reason’s “problem” in all senses of the Kantian Idea can no longer be 
“rejuvenated” by any other critique of reason but only “understood.” To 
understand how the distance between the universal fundamental concepts of 
man and the singular figure of the refugee would be to see how “justice and 
virtue, wrongdoing, power and vice, talents and their achievements, passions 
strong and weak, guilt and innocence, grandeur in individual and national life, 
autonomy, fortune and misfortune of states and individuals” are all justified 
from the point of view of world-history (Hegel, PR §345). Therefore even the 
unyielding rule of the Nation-State, which thinkers like Arendt and Agamben 
bring out as the problematic paradox in something that aspires to be a 
universal human rights is exposed to “a maelstrom of external contingency” in 
Hegel’s formulation of international law (§340). To the extent that relations 
between autonomous states must once again be aufgehoben to become the 
history of the world whose right is the “highest right of all” (§340), the 
paleonym of the human is in world-history exemplary of the declining nation 
in that both are only an “adopted child” who has “lost the interest of the 
absolute” (§347) and nonetheless activates the Hegelian interest in-and-for the 
world.  
This simultaneity of adoption and abandonment, of the loss of absolute 
interest and the re-activating interest announces “an hour” when 
Gleichgültigkeit is aufgehoben just as Indifferenzpunkt brings the three 
universal, particular and singular together as the posited identity of one and 
the same universal. This is an hour that “has struck already and count no 
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longer in world-history” (Hegel, PR §347). What seems to count, however at 
the same time and therefore in the same simultaneity, is the other hour of the 
nation which “is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of 
the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind” (§347). The 
difference between the insignificant hour and the significant one cannot be 
more pronounced; Hegel utters it all quite well again. Indeed, the past hour 
anticipates another that is “already-not-yet” and the gleichzeitig that comes to 
be and passes away does not, as Hegel argues in the Philosophy of Nature, 
take place in time (§258). Only then could it be said that the immediate 
vanishing of their difference “into singularity is the present as Now which, as 
singularity, is exclusive of the other moments, and at the same time 
completely continuous in them” (Hegel, PN §259, emphasis added).  
Thus despite Hegel’s insistence on combining as many ones as we 
want since “the ones, or the numbers are themselves indifferent [gleichgültig] 
toward each other, the unity into which they are transposed appears to be an 
external combination” (Enc., §102), the enumerated hour must be aufhegoben 
in order to make way for the absolutely Indifferent [Indifferenzpunkt] hour of 
the world mind. For gleichzeitig can only be so if the Aufhebung is absolutely 
Indifferent [Indifferenz] to enumeration: “it is therefore a matter of complete 
indifference whether we regard an object determined by external end as a 
realized end or only as a means” (SL 750). The end that is the hour of the 
world mind is “at the same time only the vanishing of the semblance that the 
beginning is something-immediate” (Enc., §242).  
 102 
What gleichzeitig functions to deliver is the untimeliness of returning 
each individual member into the beginning that is “at the same time the 
beginning of a new member” (Hegel, SL 842). As the member who does not 
vanish but is merely renewed, the hour of the world mind is thus instead the 
semblance of vanishing of abstract equivalence, of the exterior and therefore 
inferior indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] that must not be thought outside of 
time anymore than it can be thought within it.29 This is why Hegel will 
continue to have trouble with this purely functional indifference, which in its 
return upsets the “gleich” that dialectics tries so hard to be absolutely 
Indifferent [Indifferenz] toward as concerns time, difference and the Concept 
itself. As it turns out, Reason’s interest in-and-for the world could little 
snigger at Kant’s “tenderness for the things of this world” (Hegel, Enc., §48) 
when it is only accessible to all worlds from the indifferent [gleichgültig] 
outside. What Hegel finds regretful in Kant’s formulation of the Idea cannot 
only be said of the peculiar strategy of “Beyond Human Rights” but also of his 
own philosophy: the paleonymy of the human “must not be regarded as a goal 
                                                
29 At this “point”, we can still only catch up with Jacques Derrida’s “Ousia and 
Gramme” for all its patience towards the concept of time, from Aristotle to 
Heidegger, as that which will never budge from within the thematic of metaphysics. 
There, the “simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous, in which the alterity and identity of 
the now are maintained together in the differentiated element of a certain same” (55), 
exceeding all dialectics, all theology, all teleology and ontology while naming writing 
as a still unthought différance. And may not writing be the condition of the 
impossibility of our catching up? We read, that time is a name for the impossible 
possibility, for this simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous (55) and further, how “we 
can go further toward naming it in our language” (67). How is “Ousia and Gramme” 
to be read otherwise than during this paleonymy?         
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to which we have to approximate but which itself always remains a kind of 
beyond” (SL 756).    
 
 
VIII.   The Go-Karts of The Paleonym 
 
Nowadays we have gone beyond the Kantian philosophy, and 
everyone wants to go further. There are two ways of going 
further, however: one could go forward or backward. Looked at 
in the clear light of day, many of our philosophical endeavours 
are nothing but the (mistaken) procedure of the older 
metaphysics, an uncritical thinking on and on, of the kind that 
anyone can do (Hegel, Enc., §41A1).   
 
The exemplification of a name is what Hegel would fear as a kind of thinking, 
which anyone can do. Indeed, “anyone” who has ever exemplified a name of 
the unthinkable and thought an Aufhebung which actually works. Perhaps by 
reaching the higher land inaccessible to Kant’s philosophy, Hegelian reason 
cannot but tremble. Such is the extent implied by Bataille means when he says 
that, “he [Hegel] did not know to what extent he was right” (qtd in Derrida, 
“From Restricted to General” 317; 328). Hegel could not know because of an 
“inward and mute” fear (PS §196) of interest that the aufhebung cannot lift up, 
conserve, and negate. The Aufhebung dreads itself and those who bear the 
burdens of such a dread. Hence those who bears discourse itself can only 
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manage a “laughter that literally never appears, because it exceeds 
phenomenality in general, the absolute possibility of meaning” (Derrida, 
“From Restricted to General” 323). For Derrida, this laughter nonetheless 
makes the difference between Hegel and Bataille shine, without showing it 
however and without saying it and above all, without mocking just how 
serious Bataille took Hegel to be (319; 323). One could, like Derrida, propose 
to describe the history of relations between Bataille and the different faces of 
Hegel as a scene before leaving the stage and the players for a textual drama 
(320). Or one could, like Althusser in describing Marx’s “play” of Hegelian 
formulae, put the scene right back into the texts themselves in the form of an 
“action of a real drama” (Reading 29).  
In both cases, perhaps neither Derrida nor Althusser are free from the 
guilt, which both Bataille and Marx found themselves when faced with the 
fear of the stakes involved in systematic thought (Bataille, Guilty 6). The over-
layering of stakes being that of philosophical reading itself (Althusser, 
Reading 30).30 Hitherto reading has to be cautious with naming in general and 
                                                
30 One of the stakes, which Althusser imposes on his own reading is the effect of the 
aufhebung as this overlooking of its aporia. In Reading Capital, Hegel’s concept of 
historical time is for Althusser an empirical and ideological “counter-example” of the 
Marxist concept of historical time contemporaneity as the condition of possibility of 
the homogeneous continuity of time in Hegel’s philosophy of history, so as to 
“retain” from Hegel “the structure of the social whole” that sets apart the from both 
the empirical as well as the ideological conceptions (97), as if the function of such a 
retaining is not the very condition of the aufhebung itself. What Althusser overlooks 
is thus the very simultaneity of the non-simultaneous which permits the Marxist 
concept of co-existence to be thought no more “in the ‘logical formula of movement, 
of sequence of time’” than outside of it (98, emphasis added). In other words, in 
overlooking that there will always be something, which the aufhebung fails to 
anticipate, negate, and maintain, Althusser misses the opportunity to posit an even 
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the implied opposition between the “real” and the “unreal,” “the practical” and 
“theoretical.”  
According to Kant, “not all activities are called practice, but only those 
realisations of a particular purpose considered to comply with certain 
“generally conceived principles of procedures,” that is, with theory – a set of 
rules or principles of a fairly general nature (“On the Common Saying” 61). In 
order for theory and practice to meet, they must be supplemented by a middle 
term, by an act of judgement (61). And we would easily recall that someone 
not born with such a talent requires the example as its “go-kart” (Kant, CPR 
A134; B173). However more is required than an exemplification in joining 
theory and practice, namely, “future experiments and experiences” from which 
one can and ought to abstract new rules for himself to complete one’s theory 
(Kant, “On The Common Saying” 61).  Not some new rules, but the functions 
of universality, which employs their abstraction. This completion of theory as 
founded on the concept of duty concerns the transcendental, that is, a priori 
possibility of knowledge or it’s a priori employment and is in fact Kant’s 
attempts to “prove” his own “method” in the first Critique’s Transcendental 
Deduction, or for showing that the categories have applicability.  
                                                                                                                           
more “radical” concept of Marxist historical time in accordance with the effect of the 
aufhebung itself. The trace of this missed opportunity is not found anywhere else but 
in “the pertinence of this Hegelian counter-example” (Althusser 96, emphasis added). 
Undoubtedly, here the prefix “counter” is supplementary. It is at once exemplary of 
the aufhebung.  
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Thus insofar as Agamben’s emphasis on the “real functions” of the 
fundamental concepts hoodwinks the aporia of Kant’s proof, the latter shows 
clearly that not only the example but the concept too has a logical use for 
giving proportion to the middle faculty of judgment in general logic. Just as 
theory is not only concerned with the form of duty and practice only that of 
the content but rather their relationship that allows their expression in the 
areas of morality, politics, and cosmopolitarian sphere (Kant, “On The 
Common Saying” 63), the pure concepts that Kant so much more prefers over 
the examples and which give unity to pure synthesis are what function to give 
completeness to the transcendental deduction of categories (CPR B104; 
A79).31 So whereas general logic is useful in bringing different representations 
under one concept, transcendental logic has for its use the pure concepts of 
understanding, which are applied a priori to objects. This supplementary 
function – always in fact accounted for by the logical functions of judgment 
(CPR B128) facilitates Kant’s exemplification of possible experience in the 
spheres of morality, politics and cosmopolitarianism and in doing so 
completes the “theoretical method” of the first Critique in a way excessive to 
what the deduction could afford.  
                                                
31 That the category already presupposes such a double function, or any 
“combination” in general (CPR B131) cannot speak for the superiority of “pure 
concepts” over “empirical or pure concepts.” Neither can it justify the dependence of 
general logic on transcendental logic.  As we have repeatedly emphasised, “unity” is 
not a category; it is only what it is by adding itself to the representation of the 
manifold and that which “contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in 
judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its 
logical employment” (CPR B131, emphasis added). 
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“For example, to name machine a machine, functioning a functioning, 
work a work, etc” (Derrida, “The Pit and the Pyramid” 107, emphasis added). 
The trembling proximity between a “for example” and a “to name” marks the 
moment when the openness of exemplification to externality, to “other names” 
begins to work and is of interest solely for being able to go outside as work 
done. In the language of speculative idealism, the indifference 
[Gleichgültigkeit] of interest lies none other than in a naming and pointing out 
of the paleonym as such. For the Aufhebung to work, an effect of paleonymy 
is already inscribed within the possibility of uttering a “for example”; it is 
impossible to disassociate the two just as it is to be completely free from the 
machine. The old name would return as a “new member” (Hegel, SL 842) with 
a “different significance” (108).   
Few philosophies other than Hegelian indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] 
could still be so interested in naming the old name when that which is purely 
functional does not have to make way for Absolute Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt], and not just for any “real function.” For once, we might 
just be interested in saying the “for example” of man.32 Suppose the 
Aufhebung were to point it out, reason can never be “disinterested” in it or 
“interested” in it merely as “an activating element”. Which means the same 
thing: reason cannot be disinterested or interested in it only to the extent that 
                                                
32 Like Bataille’s man of recognised negativity, an interest in the paleonym would be 
to discover something “ ‘to do’ in a world, where, from the point of view of actions, 
nothing is done any more. And what he has ‘to do’ is to satisfy the portion of 
existence that is freed from doing: it is all about using free time” (“Letter to X, 
Lecturer on Hegel” 298). 
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its exemplification functions to name “a punctual simplicity of a concept” 
(Derrida, Positions 71).  
If “any philosophical concept can be a yet determined example for 
itself” (Derrida, Specters of Marx 34), this yet-to-be-determination cannot be 
thought along a necessary succession of stages through which the Spirit 
elevates and completes itself into an onto-theological or onto-teleological 
totality. If man has been thought and at the same time continues to be 
unthinkable as an example, it resounds with Derrida’s suggestion of the ethical 
and political rule which says that we must not sacrifice too many of either: 
“One must begin from a place where man is not, where there is not man, 
where one does not know what it is” (“Ethics and Politics Today” 311). 
Should such a pure function be scornfully rejected or denied, we would be 
leaning close to the same hypocrisy that Hegel is guilty of despite his adamant 
warnings to the contrary (PS §631).  
Let “anyone” then say this: the paleonym functions as it is. It maintains 
a grasp on the organisation of a reduced predicative trait, previously held in 
reserve and limited in a given conceptual system, in order to transform the 
organisation effectively (Derrida, Positions 71). Each time, reason activates 
something that will be aufgehoben but this aufhebung itself cannot be simply 
re-taken back into its own “activity.” Thus if it is only due to this presentation 
that thinking confronts the objective world with all its impotent shapes – it is 
the cognition of subjectivity, or the subjective Concept itself, which, being 
dialectical, “breaks through its own barrier, and opens itself up into objectivity 
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by means of a syllogism” (Hegel, Enc., §192A). Ultimately, the human, or the 
animal “as such” does exist because our exemplification of it is what precisely 
enables us to recognise it and through which any member can return at all (SL 
842). However Indifferent [Indifferenz] the interest of dialectical thinking 
must be to all shapes and sizes, it must be able to point out and so accept its 
own indifferent [Gleichgültig] activity – the latter as an openness to 
externality is the singularly radical function which keeps it from becoming a 
misanthrope.  
If it is only due to such an interest that philosophy would once more be 
able to recognize each individual member in its returning into the beginning 
that is “at the same time the beginning of a new [one]” (Hegel, SL 842), what 
then remains to be “understood” by the dusk of this philosophy is still the 
paleonym. For no one or nothing can be more problematic to the interest of 
human rights – an interest which exceeds the hierarchical, oppositional set-up 
between actualised, self-conscious Reason and passive, observing Reason in 
the Phenomenology.33  
In the end, the wariness of being too interested in the paleonymy is 
perhaps what really sets the “proper name” of a philosopher apart from 
“anyone”. It may well be what distinguishes the “real functions” or “pure 
spirit” of the first from the contaminated externality of the “verdict of a third 
                                                
33 Hegel disparages observation as that which can encounter Reason while not 
actually possessing any rational ordering and is “not immediately an immanently 
grounded system of shapes.” It is “idle interest,” which is still nothing more than a 
subjective opinion about Reason with “a childlike “friendliness” (§297).  
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party”. Precisely in view of these very possibilities, it is with Agamben and 
Hegel that we can begin to read Kant once again:  
Till then we cannot learn philosophy; for where is it, who is in 
possession of it, and how shall we recognise it? We can only 
learn to philosophise, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in 
accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually 
existing attempts at philosophy, always, however, reserving the 
right of reason to investigate, to confirm, or to reject these 
principles in their very sources (CPR A 838; B 866).   
 
And “anyone” not born with this talent of reason, as we know, can 
always look to examples as go-karts of judgment. To the question, “what 
more, could the name or the example do to interest us?” this much shall be 
said: nothing more, just by doing what it does. What remains interesting 
















What costs humanity very dearly is doubtless to believe that one can have 
done in history with a general essence of Man, on the pretext that it represents 
only a Hauptgespenst, arch-ghost, but also, what comes down to the same 
thing – at bottom – to still believe, no doubt, in this capital ghost. To believe 
in it as do the credulous or the dogmatic. Between the two beliefs, as always, 







The paleonymy of the human intervenes in what produces it and sets it to 
work – an intervention that is not simply a reciprocating activity. In the name 
of rights and that of true philosophical interest, the paleonymy transforms its 
previously renounced universality as well as the Indifference 
[Indifferenzpunkt] that was kept to a hierarchical and therefore topological 
subordination. For all the coincidence which we have left the previous chapter 
with in the current rhetoric surrounding humanitarian intervention, third party 
verdict and neutrality, the significance of these terms as they remain as 
 112 
repetitive and autonomous effects of the Aufhebung is by no means 
coincidental or contingent in the usual sense of the word.   
The paleonymic interest no longer attests to “the verdict of the third 
party” (Hegel, SL 420), whose opening is still systematically administered 
from the interiority and must be aufgehoben in the course of Hegelian 
dialectics. To think the former in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual 
persona as first introduced in the dissertation, if the philosopher is the 
concept’s friend and his conceptual persona or personae is his destiny “at the 
same time that these personae themselves become something other than what 
they are historically, mythologically, or commonly” (What is Philosophy 64, 
emphasis added), then the relation of the paleonymy – being the becoming-
persona or personae of the concept – to its object of intervention is never as 
clear-cut as the first, second, and third-person variations of address make out 
to be.  How are “we” to make out this relation? From what vantage opening of 
the name “man” are we supposed to view its far ends? As Derrida centrally 
restages through a series of idiomatic questions, “we” is “the name of that 
which assures the transition between metaphysics and humanism via the we” 
(“Ends” 121). The equivocal sense of the two ends has unceasingly played out 
the scene whereby nothing overwhelms man in relation to its end (123). To be 
in between the two we is to further intervene in and of the old name and 
strategically, to carefully negotiate the necessity for a “change of terrain” so 
that whatever trembling which may come from the “outside” does more than 
merely closing the distance from one end to another (135). Between the two 
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we as it is between “two beliefs, as always, the way remains narrow” (Derrida, 
Specters 175).  
Hence an intervention that is simultaneously an invention in place of a 
conclusion to this present study. For the oblique chain of names evoked in the 
name of rights and simultaneously in the name of man – from de Gouges, 
Bentham, Marx, Arendt, Agamben, Kant and Hegel, among others – threatens 
a violent acknowledgement of the West to its Other. Do not the critiques of 
human rights today often announce the urgent opening to such an “outside”? 
Would not a study that knowingly attaches the paleonym to the labels of an 
already overpowering system of thought risk losing the very interests of any 
possible intervention? It is as if everything complicit in the universal we of 
man can be acquitted by the entry of another foreign singularity, as if interest 
must once again be absolutely Indifferent [Indifferenz] to the effects of 
foreignness in the non-coincidental coinciding of naming concepts.  
In Lu Qiao’s short story, “Un-becoming Human” (see “Appendix”), all 
living beings can become men should they desire so and train hard for it. 
However it is not just the animal spirits residing in the forests, which are 
patient and tenacious in their tasks. It is the apparently most human character, 
the old lady who “takes on the dark roads at night by herself” (140), who time 
and again encounters spirits in order to tirelessly mingles and intervenes in 
their becoming. For Lu gives several reasons whereby travellers invite these 
phantasmagorical creatures up onto their carts: some do so out of ignorance of 
their identity, others do so despite full knowledge of it as they see no harm in 
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“having a conversation to kill boredom” (132). Indeed, in this story written 
along the tradition of Chinese Liaozhai legends34, ghosts and man do not just 
speak to each other; their correspondence hinges on the former receiving 
“personal praises from men” (132). Should a traveller note that the spirit has 
not attained higher stages of becoming man and still resembles the creature 
that it is and calls it by the general appellation “shoddy calf,” it will lose 
decades of painstaking training (132). On the other hand, if the traveller 
remarks that the spirit bears some sort of resemblance to a particular person, 
for example, to an uncle back home, the spirit will on account of that remark 
leap over years of training and take the physical form of that person (134). The 
becoming of men is not the un-becoming of the ghost in a dialectical inversion 
but rather the invention of a new persona: “[o]ne wonders just how many 
spirits have become men’s relatives or friends in this way” (134). “In this 
way,” or rather, in the name of becoming, these relatives or friends, who 
would have the ability to give a ghost the “proper name” in all of its universal 
propriety is no more the origin of proper naming than his or her interlocutor 
ought to be merely “shoddy calves.” As far as their names go, both men and 
ghosts can be found in heaven or on earth; each one a living example of the 
other.   
Thus the old lady decides between the general appellation of “shoddy 
calf” and the proper name of “man” on the basis of a “we” that is strangely 
ambivalent in Lu Qiao’s account. The distinction between the general 
                                                
34 See fn2 in “Appendix.” 
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appellation of the nonhuman and the proper name of man is made on a level of 
address, which blurs the two from the inside of propriety. For the becoming 
that Lu hints at is that of the old lady herself. There is nothing in the story that 
dismisses the possibility that she too, has morphed from a spirit: “Some 
become men especially to do evil; others turn out to be kinder and more 
humane than those who are naturally born so” (134).    
 Driving the horse-cart as if she were “simply gliding along” (136), the 
old lady intervenes not with the pure identity of the human but the already 
ghost-like trace of the paleonymy. The “dark forests” marks the traces of 
exteriority everywhere insofar as the latter, as what holds power over naming, 
is also once transformed from a “general appellation.” To the classical Greek 
distinction between the different correlations of man, “Un-becoming Human” 
distends this hierarchy and extends it to an outside that is co-extensive with its 
writing and even its title.  
As for Foucault’s critique of modern epistemology as contended in the 
Introduction whereby man’s Other ought to be thought more truly other than 
as the mere inverted name of man (Foucault 355-6), a “change of terrain” to 
this “other-than-Western” story looks less towards a teleological awakening 
from the anthropological sleep. Instead, such a change takes as its lesson the 
old lady’s gusto, whose encounters with other names through the late nights 
produce something that no longer serves in the name of one authoritative 
interest. It names an effect as internal to man as it is foreign to it. As to 
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whether future cart-drivers believe it or not – this is the question rather 
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“Un-becoming Human,” Translation of  





It is very fortunate to be born as men. One must constantly remember the rare 
fortune, cherish this rather precious fate and think frequently of the multitude 
of living beings, which are unable to be so by nature.   
There are many stories of these un-becoming humans. Now I shall 
speak only of one strange, phantasmagorical legend as a conclusion to 
Human36.  
 
                                                
35 This is my translation of the short story. Its original title in Chinese is   
<<不成人子。>> 
36 “ 人子”  is the title of the selection of short stories by Lu Qiao, in which this text 
is collected. In the preface, Lu writes: “since all these stories cannot possibly be of 
human experience, they can then surpass individual reality with an 
incommensurablity, which allows us to appreciate them without having to compare” 
(2). Further, he describes “Un-becoming” as “a passage which reflects the whole 
book, and also its punctuation mark. Like a small nail, these illusory stories are to be 
eventually still nailed in the world. The world is like the soil for these stories, the 
latter should be deeply buried there” (3). “Un-becoming Human” is a modern take on 
the tradition of Liaozhai stories. It may be of interest, though unsurprising to us that 
Franz Kafka admired some of the Strange Tales of Liaozhai in translation. In a letter 
addressed as well to Felice Bauer (Jan 16, 1913), he described them as “exquisite.” 
Strange Tales of Liaozhai was written by Pu Songling and is one of the first classical 
literary work on animal spirits and their relations with men as is well-known in 
Chinese folklores.  
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There are numerous desolate mountains in the province of Jilin, 
underneath which lie many ancient forests. Travellers, especially those who 
journey at night, often meet mountain spirits, ghouls and strange creatures all 
morphed from wood, stone, animals and beasts. These creatures, intelligent or 
not, all wish to train to become men. The training periods vary but they take 
up to several centuries at the very least and it is not uncommon for some to 
last a few millennia. Those born as men would never be able to conceive just 
how difficult it takes to train to become one!      
Around the region of Chang Bai Mountain, Jilin, live spirits mostly 
morphed from foxes, martens, weasels and wild boars. It is more rare, though 
not unlikely, to have some metamorphoses from larger animals like bears or 
tigers.  
Because this region is so vast and thinly populated, most people travel 
in large wooden carts. These two-wheeled long carts need to be pulled by a 
minimum of two or three horses, some requiring up to four or five. If more 
than three horses are used, there would be an old horse latched in front of 
them to lead the way.  
A cart like this can take on several passengers, depending on its cargo 
load. If the latter is light and the road is not too steep, the cart can travel at 
quite a fast speed, covering up to sixty kilometres in a day. Tumbling along, it 
makes a pattering sound so rapid that the passengers’ bones can be tumbled 
weak. When they finally get off the cart, they can barely stand on their two 
legs and must rest for half a day before they can fully walk. 
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However rough such cart rides are, it sure beats walking in terms of 
safety and speed. Shall cart-drivers chance upon travellers, it is habitual to 
invite him or her up along for the ride; it makes for some companionship as 
well as for strength in numbers in the occasion when some ghastly creature 
comes along. Travellers often do not reach their destination till nightfall by 
which then such creatures get bolder. They usually follow the carts from afar, 
either singularly or in a small group, scurrying from behind one tree to another 
all the while glancing at the people on board.  
These mountain spirits have no harmful intentions; they merely wish to 
become human. It is difficult to cross paths with men in this rather uninhabited 
and rural, place. Once there comes such a chance, they must look carefully so 
that they can learn from their human ways. However much they take in and 
learn over the centuries of practise and training, these spirits still cannot 
achieve human form. Hence standing up on their hind legs, they can only 
swagger and limp along while thinking to themselves that they already look 
very convincing. The people of Dongbei, namely, those from Jilin province 
and beyond, call such spirits and ghouls, which have merely attained this stage 
of training by the name of “shoddy calf”  [蹩犊子]   – a derogatory, cursing 
term. Once any spirit is called by such a name, it will lose decades of 
painstaking training. 
Difficult as it is to attain human form, it is comparatively much easier 
to be able to fly or to be invisible. It is also easier to eventually converse in 
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human language – almost like how parrots are able to do so after some 
concentrated learning.  
Precisely so, cart-drivers have to be extra careful on the road. In order 
for these “shoddy calves” to pass through the last stage of becoming human, 
they have to receive personal praises from men. So whatever their human 
interlocutor says they look like, they can on that account become that. All that 
the spirits require in order to reach full attainment is really just this one phrase 
of human utterance. Many of the solitary travellers, whom one meets in the 
wilderness are not men but “shoddy calves” in thick leather robes and large 
hats worn lowly to cover more than half their faces. In the blistering wind and 
heavy snow – so cold that one is forced to tears only to have the tears freeze 
into little icicles – cart-drivers often invite someone up alongside for a ride 
even before they have had a clear look and consider if it is likely in the first 
place for any person to be walking out from such deep mountains.  
But so be it if one has invited a “shoddy calf” up one’s cart. There is 
no harm having a conversation to kill boredom. And so the cart-driver yells at 
the horse, his whip swinging high in the air making a whooping sound. 
Knowing that its master is not afraid and furthermore if it is daytime, the horse 
has little to fear too and runs along swiftly.  
Some “shoddy calves” come looking for men just for the chance to 
chat for a distance before alighting. There are others, which simply hesitate to 
get on the cart for fear of revealing their identity; they would then change into 
a gust of wind and disappear without a trace. When this does happen, it does 
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not bother the cart-drivers. They would swing their whips a few rounds up in 
the air sounding as if they are setting off fire-crackers to chase off the ghastly 
air, while at the same time remarking out loud to themselves and to their 
horses: “I had from the start detected that he was a ‘shoddy calf’! Just that I 
am travelling alone and am willing to find anyone to talk to.” 
And so the horse would shake his head happily up and down, the bell 
hanging from his neck responding in chimes and jingles. So cheerful would 
the horse be that it would even jump up, give a few kicks, and shakes its hoof 
a little.  
Spirits, which are better prepared, behave differently. They have 
strategised well before coming to receive help from mankind. If a cart-driver 
identifies one such spirit from its skilful appearance, chances are it could 
speak fluently too and so could serve as a real human companion. Should he 
utter somewhere in their conversation, that “ You look so much like an uncle 
of mine back home!” the sprit would immediately respond with a “ Thanks for 
this one sentence from you! Thank you, thank you, I will never forgive your 
kindness!” After saying so, it will depart joyously. From then on the sprit will 
indeed have the physical form of some cart-driver’s uncle and truly become 
human. One wonders just how many spirits have become men’s relatives or 
friends in this way. Some become men especially to do evil; others turn out to 
be kinder and more humane than those who are naturally born so.   
The same happens to travellers driving at night. Very often, they would 
meet these semi-human, yet largely still ghost-like creatures. Even some 
 129 
which are really far from being able to pass off as men wish that they would 
have higher chances of doing so at night. But they scare the horses first before 
they can even approach. If a horse knows that there are ghosts, spirits or 
anything, which are harmful and invisible to human eyes, it will exhale 
deeply. Nervous and unsettled, it will flare up its nostrils and turn up its lips: 
“pffftu, pffftu!”  
Once one horse starts to make this sound, others will realise and let out 
the same sound in fright. The cart-driver must then control his steeds as 
skilfully as he can for once he hesitates along the dark roads and they start to 
run in all directions, the cart might just crash into some rock or tree and the 
cart might overturn and someone would be injured. 
Thus no matter how lonely people get when travelling at night, few 
truly have the courage to invite strange and unknown forms up their cart. It is 
best to pick up the speed of their whips and arrive early at an inn. As the 
horses gallop, the red lantern hung below the seats spins after the rotating 
wheels and casts onto the ground dark shadows of the horses’ scattered 
movements, traversing through the forest where “shoddy calves” of various 
sizes hiding in their dark corners would then emerge from behind the trees and 
follow in pursuit. 
The cart-drivers have little patience for these spirits come night-time. 
Their horses too lose their cool and let out deep, unending breaths.   
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There lives at the bottom of Chang Bai Mountain a strong and healthy 
old lady. She is a very good cart-driver and especially likes to travel at night. 
She needs no company and is never afraid to be alone.   
The old lady usually drives a large five-horse, wooden cart and hangs 
below her seat a pair of red lanterns, one by each side. Two pairs of horses are 
latched right in front of the cart while her favourite old, black stallion leads 
them far ahead. Tall and big, it wears a red tassel on its head adorned with a 
sonorous bronze bell.   
The old lady carries a long, sharp whip, which is never used on her 
horses for they always understand their owner. She uses the whip in the day on 
the horse-flies. Even if one were to land on an ear of the big black horse 
furthest from her, at least fifteen meters away, she could lash her whip forward 
and with a fierce withdraw, kill the horse-fly instantaneously. The insect 
would drop to the ground just as the whip makes a sound in the air as crisp as 
that of a pine branch crackling in the fire. The big black horse would then flap 
his ears a few times, thanking the old lady. The bell on its head would also, 
echoing the animal, acknowledge with some extra rings.  
The shops and inns around this region all recognise this particular 
bell’s sound. When the old lady travels at night, the innkeepers can hear her 
cart race through the dark forests, which tells them that it is time to come out 
from their inns to receive their guest.  
They greet this old lady differently from the way they greet the other 
cart-drivers. For the latter, the innkeepers would customarily pour them a 
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drink to calm their nerves and ask comfortingly if they have had a rough 
journey. The old lady, on the other hand, never gets startled and she never 
needs a drink. When she jumps down from her cart, she gets on with her 
sturdy legs and walks off readily. The ink-keeper who goes out to greet her 
would always ask how the “shoddy calves” on her journey are this time. The 
old lady always replies modestly, “fine, fine, you think too highly of me 
really.”  
But it has to be said that the old lady steers her way through the late 
nights with much gusto. Do not be deceived by her appearance as an old 
country woman: with her thick cotton pants strapped securely onto her legs, 
the latter are not let to hang outside the cart. With her green-shoed feet 
elevated, she sits cross-legged on the seat. Raising the hand holding the whip, 
she drives her cart slow and steady regardless of how heavy a load it is 
carrying. Our old lady rides as if she were simply gliding along.  
After she leaves the village inn and enters the woods where awaits all 
the “shoddy calves,” it would be time for her to let her real powers show.  
Her big black horse first exhales, “pffftu, pffftu” and other horses 
begin to be alerted to their task like soldiers on the frontline. The old lady 
swishes her whip a few times to show that she too is aware. Slowing down and 
letting the horses pace at their own speed, she sits cross-legged and observes 
the surrounding like a general at war surveying the grounds. The pair of red 
lanterns also sways majestically. 
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Hiding in the shadows, the already crowded clusters of “shoddy 
calves” small and large start to increase in numbers. They recognise the old 
lady. Pushing, shuffling, and chasing after the cart, some of them can no 
longer control themselves and shouts out – “Old lady, old lady, how are you 
doing?” On the road ahead, one of them runs around from behind a tree. 
Barely a meter in height, it uses the tip of its feet and runs backwards so as to 
let the light shine onto its face in hope that the old lady can see it clearer. “Old 
lady, old lady, what do you think I look like?”  
So the old lady does make use of the light to give the creature a careful 
scrutiny: it is in fact a little bear. It was struggling with its walk the last time 
she passed by and now it can really use its hind legs and run in reverse! With 
the way that it is gesturing with its front paws while tip-toeing on its hind legs, 
scurrying backwards, it comes close to nearly crashing into the old lady’s 
horses a number of times!  
The old lady adores the creature and wants to be of help. She says to it: 
“you are such an obedient little bear, already looking like a child! Keep on 
practising and show me what you have got the next time!”  
“Thank you, thanks old lady!” If the little bear still fails to get a word 
of praise from the old lady, it would not have managed to run for so long but 
would have fallen down on its four legs and crawl by now! By saying that it 
already bears some semblance to a child, the old lady’s praise can well stand 
for fifty or sixty years of practice and training. The little bear happily shows 
its appreciation and falls to its four legs, jumps back to the dark corners of the 
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forest and rest. Sounds of joy and laughter can then be heard from the 
shadows.     
A boar-like creature jumps into the light. “Old lady, old lady, what do 
you think I look like?”  
She sees that it still pretty much looks like a boar. Not able to stand up 
straight, it cannot run backwards properly and must follow behind the cart till 
it reaches its side and before it can even turn round to utter those few words, it 
is overtaken by the cart!  The anxious creature is like a dog following its 
master round and round his feet.  
“To me, you are far from looking like anything! Don’t be so impatient!” 
But because the old lady’s tone is still rather adoring, this boar’s training will 
leap forward by at least ten years.  
Just as she has finished speaking, the lights shine on a spot faraway 
and a little old man appears alone wearing a coat and a hat, underneath which 
shows two small eyes, sharp and bright.  
The big black horse is startled and stops in its tracks even before it has 
time to let out a deep breath, almost causing the two pairs behind to bump up 
against itself.  
The old lady takes one look and knows that this is an evil creature 
changed from the weasel. Perhaps it has already attained a thousand years of 
training! When the creature was just an animal, its had been sly and cruel; 
since his attainment, nothing has changed of its evil ways. Abusing the powers 
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it now has, it treats the birds and beasts around the surrounding woods with 
much malice.  
Yet it is confident that its mature dressing, manner of speaking and 
behaviour will impress the old lady: “My dear old lady, you have travelled for 
a long distance, hope your have had a good trip! Allow me, a simple country-
folk to here sincerely extend my greetings!”   
The old lady merely gives the tip of her whip a light shake and the big 
black horse starts to proceed on its journey. The remaining four horses 
subsequently pull up the cart and slowly move forward. The old lady keeps 
her eyes on the creature, which in turn looks straight back at her. The forests 
are hushed except for some movements coming from certain smaller “shoddy 
calves,” which are afraid of being blocked of the view and so in trying to snug 
their heads out for a good look, step on a pine branch and occasionally make a 
snapping sound.  
The little old man changed from the weasel now comes close enough 
into the headlights. Suddenly, “Pah!” a loud thud is heard. The old lady does a 
quick whiplash, accurate and strong, and sends the little old man’s hat flying 
in mid-air. A head of light brown, shiny fur and two small, mousy ears appear.  
“A simple country-folk indeed! I see that you are still just an old 
“shoddy calf!” Always a “shoddy calf!”  
“Chi – chi!” the weasel cries and whines while scampering back into 
the deep mountains. With one whiplash, the old lady has struck off one or two 
decades of training from it.  
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So this is really why the old lady takes on the dark roads at night by 
herself. She helps the kind-hearted, humane animals in their becoming from 
phantasmagorical creatures to humans. As for those, which are unbecoming of 
men, one lash from her whip makes sure that they remain as “shoddy calves” 
forever.   
 
 
 
